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One soon learns to identify the sound of enemy weapons and
take appropriate action, i.e. seek a foxhole with incoming artillery
shells. A great deal of "incoming mail" can be sustained
without being hit.
Getting one infantry division and one armored division across
one narrow bridge, under fire, presents a problem.
Map reading, correctly, is a necessity. So is the reporting of
one's position. It is unclear as to why there were no radio reports
from the first units on Haut Vents.
Identification of one's self to friendly forces saves lives,
as with Col. Lovelady's putting out identification panels for
air corps planes.
We did have a "secret" weapon -- our artillery. After
the war Major General Frederic J. Brown, our division artillery
commander, said we fired more shells in the ETO than any other
Allied unit, and it all began here, West of the Vire.
The Sherman tank could knock out German tanks, but it was
not easy. It was generally conceded that the German tank guns
had more punch and better (face hardened) armor, but the Sherman
with its high profile, homogeneous armor and low velocity 75
mm gun did have advantages - its motors were more dependable,
its track longer lived and quieter, the turret turning mechanism
more efficient and even the optical sights better than those
on the German tanks, and when the higher powered Navy 76 mm gun
began replacing the 75's our performance improved.
Air support, particularly from P-47's, was a great help.
An artillery observer was to be cherished by a unit commander
- and used.
War goes on 24 hours in the day.
Higher commanders insistence that stalled tank columns coil off
the road (instead of using it for parking purposes) was eminently
correct, but not always possible.
MP's infiltrating vehicles through the crossroads below St. Jean
de Daye between artillery shells had learned quickly.
"Take charge" officers, as with Col. Roysdon at Haut
Vents, can make the difference in the success of an attack, and
so does digging in on defense when it comes to survival.
K and C Rations, and five-in-one rations, made for three meals
a day and freed troops from the kitchen, but it got monotonous.
Supply of munitions, rations, and POL proved satisfactory, as
did evacuation of wounded.
Air domination over the battlefield proved very beneficial.
Engineer water points and a supply of potable water was very
welcome and kept down disease.
We lacked issue command vehicles, such as that contrived in the
G-2 Midlothian, with raised bows, allowing one to stand, a built-in
map desk behind the driver and a typewriter in place behind the
passenger seat in the half-track, with a map board on the right
side of the compartment, a safe in the left rear corner, topped
by a field telephone with butterfly screws for wires welded just
outside. General Bohn lacked this. General Hickey's staff had
made for him a armored trailer constructed of steel, about 8
x 12", with a power ventilator and small office installed,
but with very insufficient flotation in having but two narrow
tires.
Interdependence and cooperation of tanks and infantry is imperative
and this should have been emphasized earlier. A means of communication
between infantry and tanks, too, is necessary.
The 36th Armored Infantry Regiment Journal does not mention
use of the 2.36" rocket-launcher known as the bazooka, but
use of it by the 30th Infantry Division as a high-angle weapon
against hard objects, causing a mortar like effect.
Our 36th's Journal, in the initial river crossing account,
does mention destruction of four German tanks, without telling
how. The bazooka, requiring two men to fire, was then or later
found inferior to the German Panzerfaust, but far superior to
the British spring-launched PIAT.
Despite all the confusion and relief of senior officers, our
battalion commanders emerged with high marks, there being but
one relieved, and he not a task force commander. Also, future
task force or battalion commanders were indicated in Paul Corrigan,
George Stallings, Herbert Mills and others.
G-2 information received was of a high order, especially the
periodic reports of V Corps, which we continued to receive after
the Villiers-Fossard action, and their map overlays were a delight.
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