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Landing in Normandy
The late Leon Ussery of McKinney, Texas, of the 36th Armored
Infantry Regiment, has this account:
"I landed in Normandy on June 18th, on the eve of the
great storm that destroyed the Mulberry harbor that had helped,
to some extent, our becoming beach-bound. About sundown a lone
Messerschmitt suddenly appeared, and even more suddenly almost
every gun in our area of Omaha beach opened up, even the small
arms of our own troops were carrying. It was probably a photographic
plane for it kept its course for a spell, then zigzagged out
to the open channel. No harm was done that I observed, but we
had an initial welcome (scare).
"We had our first casualty within a few days while we
were still coiled up in a small orchard awaiting the arrival
of the remainder of our outfit (he was in regimental headquarters).
"The motor sergeant, Herb Lock, was standing by his track
beneath the camouflage netting listening to the 88's coming into
a nearby field. No shells hit in our area, but a small bit of
shrapnel found Herb, piercing his side. It was not a nasty looking
wound, but we had our first fatality. He died a few days later.
"Some 10 days later we earned our Combat Infantry Badges
in an attack across the Vire River."
First Blood at Villiers-Fossard
This was our initial commitment to combat, with Combat Command
A the principal player, the object to dent a German salient fronting
our 29th Division of V Corps. It was, to us, an important action.
The day: June 29th.
However, CROSS CHANNEL ATTACK, the official army history,
disposed of it in these words:
"General Gerow (29th Commander) launched a limited objective
attack with the recently arrived 3rd Armored Division at Villiers-Fossard.
The purpose was simply to wipe out an enemy salient in the 29th
Division lines and so secure a more favorable line of departure
for the forthcoming resumption of the 29th Division's drive toward
St. Lo. The crisis at St. Lo passed when the 3rd Armored Division,
having achieved its main objectives on 30 June, halted."
What follows is a first hand account by William J. Camey of
the Division Artillery section:
"After completing the beach landing on 24 June, Combat
Command A (CC A) of the Division was committed on 29 June in
an attack to take out a German salient in our lines near the
town of Villiers-Fossard, three or four miles north of St. Lo.
This pan of Normandy is the bocage country of apple orchards,
small fields with high earthen hedgerows, and sunken roads.
"German infantry could get good defensive positions with
overhead cover from artillery air bursts by digging into the
hedgerows. Due to the nature of the terrain tanks have limited
mobility and visibility is limited making artillery fire adjustments
difficult. Also an infantry company commander on the attack could
find it very difficult to know the location of his platoons.
"At 0900 Combat Command A began the attack with two task
forces abreast. Each task force had a 105mm self-propelled artillery
battalion in direct support. I was running the Division Artillery
Fire Direction Center and had three more 3rd Armored Artillery
Battalions in general support under my control as well as a call
on battalions of XIX Corps Artillery.
"We had worked together as a team for two and one-half
years but this was the first combat action. Things went relatively
smoothly at first. However, the terrain and profuse vegetation
made it almost impossible to know the exact location of some
of our units. One duty of a forward observer is to keep his fire
direction center informed of the location of his supported leading
elements. This information, which is vital for the safety of
the command is then relayed to the Division Artillery Fire Direction
Center.
"Our leading element reports were not good for several
reasons. First, in this compartmented terrain it was sometimes
impossible to see them, and even if one did, to get a correct
map reference. Normally, map coordinates for enemy forces and
for adjusting fire are given by radio in the clear. Map coordinates
for friendly forces are given using a simple map code. The reporting
of leading elements was a low priority when you are getting shot
at, when you didn't know for sure where the friendlies were,
and when these dubious results had to be encoded.
"The Division Commander, Major General Leroy Watson,
and Division Artillery Commander, Colonel Fredric J. Brown, had
an observation post on a small hill where they could watch the
action. I had a telephone line to them.
"In mid-afternoon, an observation post was hit with a
major tank infantry counterattack. We learned later the counterattack
was mounted by elements of one of the best divisions the Germans
had in Normandy, Panzer Lehr Division. One of the direct support
battalions requested a T.O.T. (Time on Target) laid down just
in front of their leading elements. Time on Target is an artillery
concentration fired so that the first volley of maybe 100 guns
burst on the target at the same time. The technique is most effective.
"In spite of not having the most accurate frontline reports,
I believed that it would be safe to shoot. I arranged for all
five 3rd Armored Division Battalions to fire plus five battalions
from XIX Corps, approximately 150 guns, everything from 105mm
to 240mm. I assigned concentration areas to each battalion by
map coordinates. A battalion concentration will cover an area
of 300 to 400 yards in diameter so a ten battalion T.O.T. would
cover an area about the size of a country club golf course.
"I called Colonel Brown and told him that it was close
to our front lines but that I thought it would be safe to shoot.
Ten battalions, 10 volleys hit the counterattack with devastating
effect - 1500 artillery rounds exploding in less than five minutes.
Even before we ceased firing we got reports of short rounds.
One battery of the 30 firing made an error of 1000 yards and
was shooting into an engineer company in reserve, causing casualties.
Normally with short rounds a cease-fire is called, and every
fire direction center and battery check their data. With this
many battalions involved, it could take 30 to 45 minutes before
firing could resume.
"The attack was stopped but not broken. The German troops
were reorganizing to press home their attack. I had a terrible
decision to make. If I ordered a cease-fire the 3rd Armored Division,
and part of XIX Corps, would be without artillery support for
a critical 30 to 45 minutes. The veteran German troops could
very well have overrun our leading formations in their first
combat action and caused severe casualties.
"If I ordered the concentration fired again, I would
cause more American casualties. I really had no choice, however.
I ordered the T.O.T. retired, and the same battery fired short
again causing additional American casualties. The counterattack
was broken, but I still agonize over this decision.
"After the action, Lieutenant Colonel Walter B. Richardson,
whose 3rd Battalion of the 32nd Armored Regiment was in the thick
of things with Col. Truman E. Boudinot's Task Force X, was interviewed.
Richardson had belly crawled through a bocage country field to
a hedgerow, on the opposite side of which was a German tank.
'What kind was it?,' he was asked. 'I don't know,' Richardson
replied, 'but it had a gun as long as a telephone post.'
"At first hearing this may not have sounded particularly
informative, but wait. There were only two German tanks in general
use with this appearance. One was the Mark IV Panther, of which
there were considerable numbers, the other the Mark V Tiger,
with relatively few in action in our area. Thus, the odds were
about three or four to one that it was a Panther. Either one,
it could more than deal with one of our tanks as to firepower.
For such a short action our losses were considerable: 333 enlisted
men, 18 officers and 31 tanks. No small loss.
"One thing the Germans were quick to learn our
'secret weapon' was our artillery. Soon prisoners were asking
about our 'automatic artillery' after one battery was getting
off a round every 10 seconds."
Marrying Up with Infantry Divisions
The 3rd Armored Division was one of the "old" heavy
armored divisions, with two regiments of tanks and one regiment
of infantry. The disparity of the ratio of tanks to infantry
was frequently corrected by the attachment on a temporary basis
of infantry from another division within the corps. In the case
of the 3rd Armored, this was mostly VII Corps and either the
1st Infantry or 30th Infantry Division, although this changed
with the problem at hand and the units available.
It was thus that Task Forces were formed. A typical task force
would comprise one battalion of tanks and infantry, the latter
less one company, with a platoon each of engineers and tank destroyers,
with the support of an artillery battalion. Within the task force
might be battle groups of an infantry company, a tank or tank
destroyer platoon, a mortar squad, and an engineer squad.
All of this came to a head with the initial coming together
of the units, particularly the commanders thereof, where orders,
objectives, axis of advance, communications - particularly radio
channels - supply, evacuation, and the like were thrashed out.
It was then that the marrying up occurred. The greatest delay
was in setting up the radio network and code procedure. To improve
communications between tanks and infantry, a field telephone
was placed in a metal box on the back of designated tanks, allowing
the infantry to communicate with the tank commander, helping
him to spot targets, etc.
It was in Normandy with the first action of the 3rd at Villiers-Fossard
on 29 June 1944 when the term "marrying up" was first
used by Colonel Graeme G. Parks, commanding officer 36th Armored
Infantry Regiment and perpetuated by Major William A. Castille,
S-2 with Combat Command B.
A successful marrying up might not have been for life, but
in many instances made for a long life.
The Windy Hill Fracas (Hauts-Vents)
This is an account of haste, confusion, reluctance, attack,
response to training, accusation, relief of officers, performances
and the eventual attainment of goals.
But let us visualize the situation prior to 7 July 1944 in
Normandy and, if you will, observe General Omar Bradley and his
operations officer. Bradley, then 1st Army Commander -- he did
not take over 13th Army Group until Patton's 3rd Army was activated
-- speaks:
"Well, we have Collins (VII Corps) and Middleton (VIII
Corps) coming down the Cotentin Peninsula headed south, and a
little deeper in Corlett (XIX Corps) sits there east of the Vire
River. Why don't we have him attack west across the Vire, headed
for St. Jean de Daye, then slip Watson's 3rd Armored in behind
him and take those trails to the southwest and seize that place
called Haut Vents or Hill 91?"
Hill 91, or Haut Vents, translated into Windy Hill in English
and it dominated the countryside in its height, and Bradley had
at the Infantry School at Fort Benning and elsewhere had expostulated
the necessity of "taking the high ground."
These orders percolated down to Major General Charles H. Corlett,
XIX Corps Commander, who had made a name for himself in the Pacific
as a commander of amphibious operations, but we were now more
or less dry land and Corlett was suffering from a tropical disease.
When it came to the 3rd Armored Division, the decision was made
to commit Combat Command B - Brigadier General John J. Bohn -
since the other combat command had been blooded at Villiers-Fossard.
Here is the account of Colonel Ralph M. Rogers, then S-3 or
operations officer for Combat Command B, as to the situation
at the beginning:
"To set the scene prior to the operation, the S-3 section
of Combat Command B had been very busy in the time between land
over Omaha Beach in mid June and the beginning of its movement
toward the crossing of the Vire in the late evening of 7 July.
"Invasion headquarters had directed the development of
three or four, perhaps as many as five contingency plans for
the possible support of units engaged in deepening the bridgehead.
"The area of those potential operations ranged across
the entire width of the bridgehead, with one plan involving the
support of forces in the British sector. The development of these
plans involved reconnaissance of routes to assembly areas; contact
with appropriate staff officers/commanders of unit to be supported;
and the exchange of vital information such as frequencies, call
signs and other S.O.I. items."
Principal German opposition across the Vire was Kampgruppe
Heintz, a task force composed in part of depleted units. On the
way to the front was the Panzer Lehr Division, previously stationed
in the Paris area. En route it was bombed. Bradley, through ULTRA
SECRET, knew it was on the way. We did not.
In the approach to the bridge at Airel, our troops, being
mounted or contained in half tracks and tanks, were accused of
causing infantry of the 30th Infantry Division to scramble off
the road to avoid being run over. This may have been exaggerated,
but it is a fundamental law of physics that two objects cannot
occupy the same space at the same time.
A map overlay reaching division headquarters and displayed
by Colonel John A. Smith, Jr., chief of staff, showed a shallow
oval across the Vire, supposedly depicting the front line held
by the 30th Division. It was strangely regular.
At the bridge itself, opposition was met in the form of small
arms fire, M.P.'s were wounded and Major Charles Kapes, division
provost marshal, received a Silver Star for his courage in remaining
on the spot and directing traffic.
The incoming "mail" also included artillery fire.
From the other side, supply trucks of the 30th were endeavoring
to make a crossing, intent on resupply of ammunition and getting
needed supplies.
There was no indication of supervision by or orders as to
bridge usage from XIX Corps. And all the while access to the
bridgehead was impeded by roads packed with vehicles and men.
Then Major William A. Castille, Combat Command B S-2 (intelligence)
says Colonel Leander L. Doan of the 32nd personally took charge
of a bridgehead which did not exist for the nighttime crossing.
Expanding on the role of the 3rd Armored M.P.'s at the bridge
at Airel, consider this:
At a recent reunion of the division this information was elicited
from members of the division headquarters and division headquarters
company:
One shellburst killed Sergeant Elwood Potts of Bordentown,
New Jersey, along with Harold S. Becklund and James G. Chelemengos,
while Captain James L. Keoun of Mt. Vernon, Illinois, was stunned.
Potts' name is not listed among casualties and killed in action
on the placard displayed at association meetings, but his death
is attested to by Frank A. Kouki of Bloomington, Illinois, master
sergeant in the G-2 Section; Charles W. Jacobs, retired Exxon
engineer, then an M.P. and Earl W. Stamm of Ephreta, Pennsylvania,
of headquarters company.
Let us now consider the composition of the three task forces
committed under Combat Command B. There was Task Force X, commanded
by Lieutenant Colonel Vincent E. Cockefair of the 36th Armored
Infantry Regiment, and his 2nd Battalion, Lieutenant Colonel
William B. Lovelady, second in command, and his 2nd Battalion
of the 33rd Armored Regiment. Then Task Force Y, commanded by
Colonel Graeme G. Parks, Commanding Officer of the 36th Armored
Infantry Regiment, and his 1st Battalion plus the 1st Battalion
of the 33rd Armored Regiment, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel
Rosewell H. King, with Task Force Z being the 3rd Battalion of
the 33rd Armored Regiment, led by Lieutenant Colonel Samuel Hogan,
with no infantry. Each task force had a detachment of the 23rd
Armored Engineer Battalion and another from the 703rd Tank Destroyer
Battalion, plus tankdozers. The 3rd Battalion of the 36th Armored
Infantry Regiment, Lieutenant Colonel Carlton P. Russell commanding,
was assigned to Combat Command A.
Returning to the bridge site, the traffic jam there was the
largest experienced since the "Y" east of Indio following
the Mojave Desert maneuvers. Consider that one tank battalion
alone, with 60 yard spacing, occupied 12 miles of road space.
Here were five battalions, reinforced, alone for Combat Command
B, with 30th Division troops and others attempting the same crossing.
Problems were not concentrated at the bridge area only. General
Corlett, the corps commander, was suffering from a tropical disease
sustained in the Pacific and before the end of the action was
assisted by Major General Walton H. Walker, former 3rd Armored
Commander. Our General Watson did not know the corps objective
and General Bohn was not allowed to clear the Vire crossing with
the rambunctious and highly vocal Major General Leland S. Hobbs,
CG 30th Infantry Division. A map overlay reaching 3rd Armored
Headquarters from the 30th Infantry previously mentioned, showed
a half moon crescent west of the Vire. In fact, advance elements
of Combat Command B encountered enemy resistance in the dark
near St. Fromond Eglise, 600 yards from the bridge.
Task Force X was first across the bridge the night of 7/8
July, destroying four enemy tanks, Mark IV's.
Bear in mind that the only principal roads in the area were
that one going west from Airel to the crossroads below St. Jean
de Daye and the southwards extension of that crossroad to Pont
Hebert, with a connecting road from Pont Herbert to Haut Vents
and beyond. And Combat Command B was cutting across the back
of the 30th's front line, advancing from field to field with
use of tankdozers and avoiding roads. Our losses were small,
one tank advance about 1500 yards, with Task Force Y moving through
X about 2200 hours of the 8th, with small gains. Late this day
Combat Command B was placed under command of the 30th Division,
Combat Command A was introduced into the bridge head on the right
flank and above Combat Command B, and to top matters it rained.
During the day attempts at coordination had been made between
Bohn and the commanding officer of the 119th Regiment of the
30th, and the division artillery officers of both the 3rd Armored
(Colonel Frederic J. Brown) and the 30th (Brigadier General Raymond
S. McLain). During the day prisoners were taken from the 2nd
SS Division and air recon reported rear movement of enemy tanks.
With infantry going one way and tanks another, an observer
reported: The best way, even under favorable conditions, to completely
immobilize troops in a small area is to put an armored outfit
there too.
July 9th was a day that many would like to forget, with reason.
The taking of Hill 91 (Haut Vents) was supposed to have been
a quick dash and seize action.
As mentioned Task Force Y had pushed through Task Force X
and was making slow progress through wet fields and Hobbs was
demanding they get on the road and move. Meanwhile traffic congestion
continued, as did rain. General Bohn went forward to deliver
the word: Get on the road. The task force commander at this point
took this as a suggestion, maintaining with some heat that it
was contrary to prior training and the directives of the corps
and division commanders. Bohn prevailed and by 2 p.m. Hobbs learned
that but a 600 yard gain had been made. Bohn's job was on the
line. After a conference with the assistant division commander
of the 30th, Bohn detached a company of tanks to go to Hill 91
and here the 36th AIR Journal clearly states: One company of
tanks of this task force (Y) were on the Combat Command B objective
by dark. But were they believed? "Breakout" says the
tanks had "disappeared" but disappeared or not, they
were strafed by U.S. Plans called for an earlier mission but
could not establish radio contact with Combat Command B, which
had been ordered to halt by General Hobbs after getting on the
St. Jean de Daye - Pont Hebert highway.
The tanks reaching Haut Vents were those of Lieutenant Colonel
Rosewell H. "Rosie" King, which had passed through
Task Force X.
But what about Task Force Z, that of Lieutenant Colonel Sam
Hogan, operating without infantry support? The after action report
of the 33rd Armored Regiment of 6 August 1944 reports that on
July 9th Task Force Z moved west.
Two I Company tanks (one of them the company commanders) were
destroyed by friendly tank destroyers. Tanks of I Company reached
the objective at Vents and tanks of the 3rd Battalion were soon
in Belle Lande. All elements were withdrawn to a defensive position
upon orders from the 30th Infantry Division except I Company
tanks which did not get the order; as a result they were bombed
and strafed by friendly planes.
News that six tanks of Combat Command B were on the objective
was received at headquarters of both the 30th Division and XIX
Corps with some skepticism.
Bohn had finally reached his objective but nobody would believe
him. He was relieved.
Let us return to the fate of the two 1/33 tanks hit by friendly
AT fire after Capt. William Redmond made a wrong turn and on
being hit broke radio silence, saying, "I am in dreadful
agony." En route he had taken out two German gun positions
facing the 30th Infantry Division and in subsequent move towards
Haut Vents, initially blocked, Lt. Henry Earl took out a German
AT gun in clearing out the way to Pont Hebert, leaving no German
held positions between there and St. Jean de Daye.
The 30th's problems were compounded by the German tanks, during
which B/743rd TD Battalion was overrun and troops of the 2nd
Battalion of the 120th Infantry Regiment broke and retreated
and calls for artillery were affected by the division artillery
displacing at that moment and the 18 artillery battalions available
could not be coordinated until the new CP was opened, after which
the fire had to be directed away from the 3rd Armored tanks on
the highway. It was the artillery which stopped this attack.
A word here about the artillery. From the history of the 391st
Armored Field Artillery groupment we find: Combat Command B continued
to attack, reached and held its objective (this on the 9th).
In the morning, vicinity of Bordigny.the enemy counter attacked.
Second Lieutenant Clarence A. Silliman, forward observer with
one of the Combat Command B assault teams, proceeded forward
under small arms, mortar and artillery fire, and adjusted the
battalion fire on enemy infantry and tanks within 50 yards of
his own position. He succeeded in stopping the counter attack,
and greatly contributed to the success of the entire operation.
Silliman was wounded and evacuated the following day.
With Major General Walton H. Walker, a former 3rd Armored
Commander, deputizing for ailing XIX Corps Commander Charles
H. Corlett, it was necessary that he quickly get in touch with
the situation. On leaving corps headquarters he stopped by that
of the 3rd Armored to consult with Lieutenant Colonel Andrew
Barr, our G-2, who told him that the principal opposition at
that time was KG Heintz, which was a task force composed of various
units. Its strength was slight in comparison to that of the combined
30th Infantry and 3rd Armored Divisions.
After the Airel bridge crossing but before the taking and
holding of Hill 91, Lieutenant Colonel William B. Lovelady, commander
of the 2nd Battalion of the 33rd Armored and a part of Task Force
X, was in his small wall tent adjoining his tank at his command
post when he heard a vehicle drive up. Shortly thereafter General
Walker stormed into the tent and, without greeting or explanation,
begin to give Lovelady unshirted hell for not being up in the
line, attacking. Waiting until there was a pause, Lovelady said,
"General, I am in reserve." Walker left as abruptly
as he entered, without a goodbye.
Colonel Ralph M. Rogers, then operations officer of Combat
Command B, has this account of the relief of General Bohn:
"After a day of unsatisfactory progress on 8 July, for
reasons previously mentioned. General Bohn went forward on the
9th both to get necessary information and to try to straighten
out the problems which had risen from the fact that Combat Command
B and the 119th Infantry Regiment (30th Division) were operating
in the same zone. His progress to the forward elements was slow
and painful along a muddy, sunken trail jam-packed with both
armored and infantry vehicles and the red plaque a single star
denoting Brigadier General's rank on the bumper of his jeep had
little effect in easing his way. I accompanied General Bohn,
and was with him for the remainder of this long day and far into
the night. Whereas the sequence of events after reaching the
forward elements is not clear to me now, in the course of a drizzly
afternoon he conferred with the commanding officer, 119th Infantry
and several senior staff officers of the 30th Infantry Division
in an attempt to stop the fire from the infantry to our flanks
and rear that was apparently directed at our armored elements.
He talked with several of our commanders and exhorted them to
cease attempting to clear the fields along the flanks of the
trail, to mount up the infantry on the tanks, and to proceed
at full speed along the trail to its junction with the main road
in the vicinity of Chateau de la Mare de Cavigny, and thence
south and southwest to seize and hold Haut Vents, the objective
of the 30th Infantry Division.
"It seemed to me then, as it does now, that it was, at
least in part, these exhortations delivered in person by the
Commanding General, Combat Command B, that broke a virtual
stalemate and restored some momentum to the advance.
"Subsequent events included Bill Redmond's misadventure
with part of his tank company making a wrong turn towards St.
Jean de Daye and ended with armored elements on the objective
at Haut Vents. This was reported to the 30th Infantry but was
not believed.
"Later in the evening, General Bohn was ordered to report
to the Commanding General, 30th Infantry Division, at the 30th
Division Command Post. I don't remember the location of that
Command Post, but it was a long way from where we were when the
order to report was received. My guess is that it must have been
somewhere in the vicinity of Isigny. En route General Bohn was
very quiet except for some short comments which indicated he
was dreading the impending confrontation with General Hobbs.
Entry into the command post brought on some 'culture shock'.
It was located in a large, brightly lighted underground room,
perhaps a previous German facility. General Hobbs was surrounded
by a covey of clerks and staff officers busying themselves around
neatly posted large scale situation maps and all the paraphernalia
of a large headquarters. It appeared to me that some of the locations
of major 30th Division units shown on the maps were rather fanciful,
to be charitable about it. In sharp contrast to General Hobbs
neat, clean uniform complete with shirt and tie. General Bohn's
field uniform was wet, muddy, and disheveled and he sported several
days growth of beard. The details of who said what to whom have
been lost in the mists of my memory. However, it was clear then
and now that General Hobbs was, in a very forthright manner,
severely castigating General Bohn for the failure of Combat Command
B to meet his expectations, attributing a large part of the failure
of his division to advance more rapidly to the presence of our
armored elements. General Bohn's response in rebuttal was low-keyed
and factual, but was not well received.
"The upshot of this meeting was that General Bohn was
informed on the next day by the Commanding General 3rd Armored
Division, that he was relieved of his command. He was replaced
by Colonel Dorrance S. Roysdon, Deputy Commander Combat Command
B, and Commander, 33rd Armored Regiment."
Countering General Bohn's predilection for a deep foxhole,
Colonel Andrew Barr rejoins that General Leland S. Hobbs' 30th
Infantry Division Foxhole "had the deepest foxhole command
post I saw in Normandy."
As to the road jam encountered by General Bohn, Lt. General
J. Lawton, later our esteemed VII Corps Commander, criticized
tank units for not coiling off the road in Normandy when not
moving forward. Desirable as that was, a look at some of the
photos in "St. Lo" of narrow sunken roads and steep
banks will convince one that the goal was not easily attained.
Also, the density of troops and equipment made this goal well
nigh impossible. Even the Germans had the same problem later,
in their first advances in the Ardennes, witness the action of
KG Peiper.
July 10th finds Combat Command B under the command of Colonel
Dorrance S. Roysdon, Commanding Officer 33rd Armored Regiment
and the forward units pulled back on orders of General Hobbs.
Here is what the after action report of the 33rd Armored Regiment
says:
"Commanding Officer, Combat Command B, Colonel D.S. Roysdon,
proceeded to the high ground at Vents where he remained with
his frontline troops for the remainder of the operation, personally
supervising the actions. Task Force X moved through Task Force
Y along the axis road towards Vents supported by fire of Task
Force Z. Sunken roads and AT fire caused congestion of vehicles
and held up advance of Task Force X. An enemy counterattack with
tanks was reported in vicinity of La Coequerie (T4771) and E
Company, 33rd Armored Regiment from Task Force Y was sent to
stop it. Enemy documents taken from a dead German captain revealed
that we had been opposed mainly by KG Heintz, which confirmed
previous intelligence reports. This battle group had suffered
about 30 casualties and had been withdrawn to the southwest under
cover of the 17th SS Division Artillery and local counterattacks
by the 30th Mobile Brigade, a battalion of the SS Regiment Deutschland
(2nd SS Pz Division) and a company of tanks from the SS Pz Regiment
"Das Reich" (2nd SS Pz Division). PWs from these
units revealed their low morale and admitted superiority of our
troops in men, arms and equipment. They all had great respect
for our artillery. Nearly all had read our psychological warfare
pamphlets and admitted they were effective. In spite of this
the enemy offered very stubborn resistance from hedgerows and
sunken roads, supported by rapid firing MGs, mortar fire and
piecemeal commitment of tanks. Artillery fire though only a fraction
of our own, and snipers harassed all our troops. Casualties:
killed in action - 0, wounded in action six. The 2nd Battalion
of the 33rd was not committed this day. Intermittent rains had
continued this day."
Combat Command B's Task Force X attack of the 10th, began
at 0600 hours along a sunken road, was slowed by having to remove
disabled tanks and, within 700 yards of Haut Vents, heavy artillery
and mortar fire. Task Force Z, attempting to pass
through Task Force X, received unexpected fire
from Belle Lande which 30th Division Infantry was unable to suppress,
even aided at 2000 hours by two platoons of tanks from E Company
33rd Armored Regiment of Task Force Y. On the right flank of
Combat Command B the 120th Infantry Regiment advanced during
the day to offer better flank support, but the entire 30th Division
was a finger stuck in the German's lines.
During the preceding three days Combat Command B was not,
of course, the only unit involved west of the Vire, apart from
the 30th Division. Combat Command A of the 3rd Armored, with
the 30th, had squeezed enough room west of St. Jean de Daye for
the 9th Division, under VII Corps, to enter the fray. VII and
VIII Corps had been pushing south from the base of the Cotentin
Peninsula while the 30th Division had been pushing west, then
south and southwest. The squeeze was on.
But of all these units, which was holding the most southern
advance? It was Combat Command B.
A change in task force composition is noted for the 10th,
when Company C of the 36th Armored Infantry Regiment with its
integrated tanks was taken from Colonel Parks' Task Force Y and
attached to Task Force X, a diminution in his role which was
to continue. Also, it will be noted that Colonel Hogan, having
recovered from the understandable shock of having a tank knocked
out from under him, was back in action.
In the approach to Haut Vents, Major Walker, Hogan's ExO,
continued to maintain crucial radio contact with the rear, saying,
"As we were approaching Haut Vents the following morning
(the 10th) artillery started coming in from our rear. I radioed
Colonel (Leander L. ) Doan and told him our own artillery was
firing on us. He said it could not be. I told him it was coming
directly from our rear. He would not accept the idea. He said
he would check it out.
"I called him ten to 15 minutes later, as it was not
just an occasional round, and told him it was still coming in
on us. He still did not want to accept the idea. I then asked
him if he could get our artillery to cease firing for a few minutes.
He said yes. I called him back in about 15 minutes to tell him
that there was no more artillery coming in on us from rear."
July 11th was a day to remember. Early in the morning Lieutenant
Colonel King with A Company of the 36th Armored Infantry Regiment
and two companies of tanks from the 33rd Armored Regiment were
ordered to the vicinity of Cavigny to meet an enemy tank threat
on the left flank, thus taking more troops from the direct control
of Colonel Parks' Task Force Y. In the approach to Haul Vents,
Walker and his communication halftrack was parked beside a hedgerow
about 400 yards east of and behind Colonel Roysdon, who was about
500 yards short of the crossroad in a four acre field, according
to Walker. Walker would get a message. Colonel Roysdon would
ask him to come up with it. German firing, both artillery and
mortar, would walk up the hedgerow one way and Walker would go
the other way. It took a certain amount of agility.
The taking of Haut Vents is blandly recorded in the after
action report of the 33rd Armored Regiment thus: Commanding Officer,
Combat Command B personally led Task Force Z and Task Force X
to the top of Vents where they arrived at 1530.
Eaton Roberts "Five Stars to Victory" says: "Colonel
Dorrance S. Roysdon personally led the attack with the infantry,
carrying a tommy gun, and shouting orders at the top of his lungs."
Bill Lovelady says, "Colonel Roysdon formed the GI's
in a line of skirmishers and went up it like taking San Juan
Hill."
Walker's recollection, which is vivid, is that a line of tanks
followed the skirmishers, with Roysdon in his tank "shouting
orders over his radio and out to an infantry commanding officer
who was walking alongside the tank". Both GI's and the tanks
were directing a constant stream of fire straight ahead and into
the bushes and trees on all the sides. However, not a single
German soldier was seen from the jump off point to the crossroads.
The 36th Armored Infantry Regiment Journal says, "Task
Force X (plus Company C and its integrated tanks) continued to
hold this objective despite terrific enemy artillery and mortar
fire until 1900. Task Force Z was ordered to the objective during
the day as well as Company B, 36th Armored Infantry Regiment
with its integrated tanks so that at 1900 Task Force X, Y and
Z (less Company A, 36th Armored Infantry Regiment and two companies
of tanks under Colonel King) were all on the objective and organization
of the ground was completed."
Combat Command B was not the only unit advancing that day.
On either side of it the expected Panzer Lehr Division finally
arrived and attacked. Lieutenant Colonel King and his detached
units were combating a portion of this newly committed German
force. The 33rd Armored Regiment after action report has this
to say: "The Panzer Lehr division, which had moved from
the British sector to attack in the direction of the Isigny and
seize that town. The 902 Pz Grenadier Regiment of this division
had been committed in our sector between the Vire River and Belle
Lande. The attack was repulsed with heavy losses to the enemy
in both personnel and equipment." 33rd Armored Regiment
casualties for the day reported were six killed in action and
31 wounded. Map 7 of "St. Lo" also shows a battalion
of the 902nd attacking west of Haut Vents toward the 3rd Battalion
of the 120th Infantry Regiment of the 30th Division.
For action occurring during the night of 11 July, Captain
George Stallings of D Company, 33rd Armored Regiment, received
a Distinguished Service Cross for when his tank was attacked
by flame throwers as he was returning to the front following
an officers meeting.
A mass of fire belched down the hatch, says "Five Stars,"
and all its occupants scrambled out. Sergeant Lewis and T/4 Mac
Humphrey died, but T/5 MacLain and Corporal Miracle (aptly named)
escaped and crawled back, wounded, to our lines.
Captain Stallings threshed the flames from his burning clothes,
ended up in a deep wet ditch as voices of a German tank hunting
patrol were heard. They checked Stalling out, decided he was
dead and when they left he walked, crawled and ran back to the
task force command post, covered with black asphalt and refused
to be evacuated.
Lieutenant Petry, also of the 2nd Battalion, 33rd Armored
Regiment, was killed by sniper fire at T463697 in the advance
while standing high in the turret of his tank, holding the line
while the infantry was putting out outposts for the night. This
day 1st Platoon D/33 Armored Regiment knocked out an Mk IV tank.
On the 11th Air Corps P-47s accounted for 13 enemy tanks,
according to "Work Horse of the Western Front," the
30th Division history.
On the 12th the P-47s were still around, the 33rd Armored
Regiment after action report saying: "P-47s strafed our
position at Vents, causing both vehicular and personnel casualties.
Heavy enemy artillery fire and mortar fire were received. The
1st Battalion supported the 119th Infantry Regiment in an attack
at Pont Hebert." That would be Lieutenant Colonel Rosie
King, who participated in the cleanup here after Jerry tanks
from across the river had dealt his tanks misery. A word about
King. Because of a speech defect (he had no defect of brain or
determination) he used Warrant Officer John Vickers-Smith as
his radio "voice," an arrangement which worked perfectly.
The day before had been one of trouble for the German 7th
Army, too, according to "St Lo" for they also found
hedgerow country hard fighting for counterattacking tanks.
On the 12th Lieutenant Colonel Lovelady, along with Colonel
Sutherland of the 119th Regiment were called forward to assist
Colonel Roysdon in directing the attack, where Lovelady stayed
until returning to his battalion on the 14th.
Reviewing the events of this period. Colonel Lovelady has
acknowledged "mistakes galore" but hastens to add:
"Two things, as I recall, were learned from the Haut Vents
action and stood us in good stead throughout the rest of the
war in the European Theater of Operation, namely:
"One, always keep the identification panels on the back
of the tanks. We were strafed by our own P-47s but as soon as
the panels were displayed the planes flew over again but did
not shoot - they flew low and it seemed to us they dipped their
wings to say 'sorry.'
"Secondly, if anything was disturbing on Haut Vents it
was our own artillery firing on us so, as mentioned, forward
observers were priceless. From then on there was one with us.
Walker reported correctly about the artillery.
"Colonel Sutherland (of the 30th Division) and I were
checking out an old farm building about 50 to 75 yards from where
Colonel Roysdon was setting up his defenses. We were in an adjacent
field separated by a hedgerow when a volley came in on us and
we hit the ground. The firing ceased and I jumped up and dove
through the hedgerow and reported to Colonel Roysdon that Colonel
Sutherland had been hit with artillery and then climbed under
my tank to recover from the 'jitters'. About 30 minutes later
I was awakened by a message from Colonel Roysdon that Colonel
Sutherland had just returned from our reconnaissance and had
reported I was a casualty from friendly artillery fire. There
was no doubt in Colonel Sutherland's and my mind that the firing
was from friendly artillery. Walker sure had this straight."
For the period from July 12th through the 16th, when it was
relieved by the 30th Infantry Division, the prescription was
the same as before on Haut Vents -- Combat Command B continued
to hold the objective despite heavy enemy artillery and mortar
fire.
On the 14th PWs stated that the Panzer Lehr was to be relieved
by parachute units.
Holding Haut Vents, Combat Command B waited for the 30th Division
to come abreast from either side, the 30th having been much affected
by flanking artillery fire from east of the Vire River on the
119th Regiment and from west of the Terrene stream on the other
flank.
Further lack of change for Combat Command B was reported on
the 15th, but Major W.O. Gilkey, who had been with the Commanding
Officer, Combat Command B at Vents, guided members of the Psychological
Warfare to the pocket of enemy resistance and under small arms
fire all the while helped the taking of 19 PWs who surrendered
after a five minute broadcast. Sometime during this action Gilkey
was killed. Actually, August 2nd.
The Journal of the 36th Armored Infantry Regiment is revealing
as to events of the 15th: "No change in any companies of
the 1st and 2nd Battalion 36th Armored Infantry Regiment, it
goes. The 30th Infantry Division launched attack at 0515; Combat
Command B continued to hold objective pending relief by 30th
Infantry Division. At 1900, Commanding Officer, Combat Command
B, issued order reorganizing Combat Command B into one assault
group (on objective) under Colonel Roysdon with Lieutenant Colonel
Cockefair in command of Infantry, Colonel Hogan in command of
tanks and Lieutenant Cleveland in command of reserves (2) Task
Force Y (Company A, 36th Armored Infantry Regiment and 1st Battalion
33rd Armored Regiment) with Lieutenant Colonel King in command
(3) Combat Command B reserve with Colonel Parks in command, 3rd
Battalion as pan of Combat Command A, moved from position SE
of St. Jean de Daye to new assembly area at Le Desert (West of
St. Jean de Daye) during afternoon.
Note that Colonel Parks, next to Colonel Roysdon the most
senior officer there, no longer had Task Force Y but merely the
reserve. At some point about then he was relieved and ordered
back to England to report to a board of inquiry. According to
Colonel William L. Cabaniss, then commanding officer of the 83rd
Armored Reconnaissance Battalion, before it was over Parks was
head of the board!
During this period a change came about as to how Colonel Roysdon
was perceived. At Warminster Barracks in England he had the brass
doorknobs shined with Blitz cloth, it was reported, and he was
generally known to be a martinet. At Haut Vents he showed another
side of his character, establishing his command post in a slit
trench under a tank on the hill crest.
The 30th Infantry Division went under VII Corps at midnight
July 15th, bringing Combat Command B with it, the first of a
long association.
From the 36th Armored Infantry Regiment Journal of the 16th
we find that all companies on Haut Vents were relieved by elements
of the 30th Infantry Division at 1500 hours and the regiment,
less the 2nd Battalion, was assigned to Combat Command A and
moved to the vicinity of Le Desert at 2100 hours, this being
where Combat Command A had considerable exposure to enemy action,
as well as Lieutenant Colonel Russell and the 3rd Battalion,
36 Armored Infantry Regiment, the latter with the 9th Infantry
Division.
What had been learned? Here is what the 33rd Armored Regiment
after action report says: "During this entire operation
24 friendly tanks were totally destroyed by enemy gun fire, mainly
bazookas. Vehicle maintenance failure due to normal breakdown
were practically non-existent. Shrapnel caused more vehicular
casualties by far than any other factor. Small arms fire caused
very few. The rate of crew members killed per vehicle destroyed
was one and a half per vehicle."
Losses for the 33rd Armored Regiment were 18 killed in action,
85 wounded in action and 22 missing in action. Figures for the
36th Armored Infantry Regiment were probably higher, but are
not available. It could have been worse.
From the log of the 2nd Battalion, 33rd Armored Regiment,
for the 16th reports: "Weather warm and sunny, morale excellent."
How did General Hobbs feel about this, he who had complained
so bitterly of us from the beginning? From "Breakout and
Pursuit" we learn: "Formerly anxious to be rid of the
combat command, General Hobbs now argued to keep it because,
as he said, he feared the armor in pulling out might 'mix up
the roads' and because his own attached tank battalion was a
60 percent loss."
General Hobbs would have to wait for Combat Command B attachment
until the action culminating at Mortain and, after that, even
longer, when it fought with him the Bulge in the La Gleize area.
By then he liked us.
By now Combat Command B was battle tested and it was just
as well. There was more to come.
Breakout from Normandy
Throughout the period before the breakout bombardment of 26
July and afterwards, the bulk of German armor was facing Montgomery's
British and Canadian army before Caen, for which there were several
reasons, as follows:
The successful Allied deception campaign was to convince Hitler
that the main effort would be above the Seine in the Pas de Calais
area, making him keep the bulk of this 15th Army forces east
of the Seine and not committed against Allied forces: this was
the Fortitude plan, with a mythical Allied Army under Patton.
The proximity of Montgomery's forces to Paris and Germany.
The area before Caen was better tank country and the Americans
were in the more easily defended hedgerow country.
There was, at the time, a joke laid to the German prisoner
of war camps to the effect that by Christmas the Americans would
be in Paris, the Russians in Berlin, and the British in Caen!
Obviously slanderous.
The St. Lo Breakthrough
The St. Lo breakthrough was all prepared and only the weather
prevented its undertaking. The period 22-24 July 1944 was one
of almost continual rain. On the morning of 26 July the weather
broke, and the greatest air show of the war prepared the way
for the breakthrough out of Normandy.
The breakthrough was to be in the zone of VII Corps. A rectangular
area about three miles by five miles between Maringny and St.
Gilles was the target of the saturation bombardment by the 8th
and 9th Air Forces.
The 9th Infantry Division, on the west, was to attack through
this saturated area and seize and hold the right flank of the
penetration. The 30th Infantry Division, on the east, was to
attack south, seize and hold the line Cerences, Tessy sur Vire,
Saint Lo. The 4th Infantry Division was to seize the high ground
in the vicinity of and east of Cerisy la Salle.
The 1st Infantry Division (Combat Command B, 3rd Armored Division
attached) was then to move through the sector of the 9th Division,
turn west near Le Sault and secure Coutances area, thereby extending
the line of the 9th Division, and cutting off the enemy facing
the VIII Corps on the west.
The 3rd Armored Division (less Combat Command B) would then
move rapidly through the 4th Division, seize the south exits
of Coutances and secure the south flank of the 1st Division between
Hymouville and Cerisy la Salle.
The 2nd Armored Division, further to the east, was to move
through the sector of the 30th Division, push south and then
west and secure the Cerences - St. Denis Ie Gast.
The attack moved successfully. On 26 July Combat Command B,
attached to the 1st Division, had fought its way to a position
just west of Marigny. Continuing the attack west, the next day
elements of Combat Command B reached Monthuchon. Then, on 28
July, they were in sight of Coutances. They did not get into
the city, but were ordered to turn back east and assist the 1st
Division in reducing an enemy strong point near Comprond.
On 25-26 July, the 3rd Armored (less Combat Command B) remained
in the assembly areas west of St Jean de Days. Then, on 27 July,
they attacked south at 0630. Initially the road craters created
by the saturation bombing and a bypassed enemy pocket south of
Marigny slowed the advance. This enemy strong point near St.
Benoit, estimated that one infantry battalion was later bypassed,
and the combat command reached Le Sault.
The next day Combat Command A turned southwest toward Montpinchon,
one of the division's objectives. There was moderate enemy resistance
all day. By night. Combat Command A had forces in position to
attack the enemy-held Montpinchon from the northeast and southeast.
On 29 July, German columns were moving south on all possible
roads. One column with many armored vehicles tried to use a secondary
road through Montpinchon and Roncey. Near St. Denis le Gast the
2nd Armored Division had effectively blocked this road. About
50 escaping German tanks were in the vicinity of Montpinchon.
They added greater strength to the already strong position at
Montpinchon. Combat Command A
was ordered to bypass the strongpoint to the north and south.
Meanwhile, the supporting groups of fighter bombers were becoming
cognizant of the situation around Roncey, where enemy vehicles
were in double columns and bumper to bumper, and Montpinchon,
where the defenders were virtually surrounded. All friendly vehicles
were notified to keep their identification markings prominently
displayed while Allied aircraft worked from St. Denis le Gast
to Montpinchon. When the bombing and strafing were finished,
a single battle group from Combat Command A tended to mopping
up Montpinchon. Another battle group was sent through Roncey.
Roads and streets had to be cleared with bulldozer. During the
remainder of the afternoon and night the Soulle River was bridged,
and Combat Command A reached Belval.
Combat Command B reverted to division control and moved from
Comprond to la Villederie.
On 30 July Combat Command A under Brigadier General Hickey
was attached to the 1st Division under Colonel Boudinot to the
4th Division and Combat Command B after General Watson was relieved.
When the attachment became effective, Combat Command A had
moved south through the still cluttered Roncey area and established
a bridgehead across the Sienne River. Combat Command B had advanced
south, and elements had forded the river at La Sayerie and reached
position on the division objective west of Villedieu-les-Poeles.
A bridge was under construction.
The next objective for Combat Command A was Mortain. The See
River had to be crossed. This was accomplished just south of
Brecey on 1 August. Then they were in the enemy's rear area and
moving fast. German service troops and combat elements were completely
surprised, and the tanks had a brief field day. Severe actions
occurred at Juvigny le Tertre and Refuvieille where the Germans
managed to organize well. Mortain was reached on 2 August. For
two hard-fought days the enemy attempted to retake the high ground
around Juvigny, but Combat Command A held its gains.
Combat Command B, meanwhile, had bypassed Villedieu-les-Poeles
and moved toward St. Pois. At this time they were given the new
objective of Cherence-le-Roussel. The next day, 5 August, the
combat command was attached to the 1st Division and ordered to
make a bridgehead over the See River in the vicinity of Cherence-le-Roussel.
This mission was accomplished, and Combat Command B held the
bridgehead until relieved by elements of the 30th Division on
6 August.
On 5 August, Combat Command A was ordered to move deeper into
enemy territory. The objective was Ambrieres le Grand on the
Mayenne River, and the route ran through Buais and le Teilleul.
Scattered opposition was met, but the combat command reached
its objective on 6 August. One battle group was sent to Barenton,
where it attached to the 2nd Armored Division and remained in
that status until 12 August. Strong patrols went into Domfront
and Lassay.
The foregoing on the breakout is concise and admirable as
to content but has no explanation as to why on 30 July Combat
Command A went to the 1st Infantry Division and Combat Command
B to the 4th Infantry Division.
The reason was that Major General Leroy H. Watson had been
relieved of his command and reduced to his permanent rank of
colonel, this done by Major General J. Lawton Collins, VII Corps
commander.
Leroy Watson was a thoroughly nice man, a graduate of all
the required service schools and with prior service in Washington,
D.C. on the general staff. He was a West Point classmate of Generals
Eisenhower and Bradley.
According to accounts in division headquarters, he had in
the wee hours of the morning telephoned General Collins - awakening
him in the process - to discuss the daylight attack. When he
made the call, he was a temporary major general commanding a
division, and when he hung up, he was a permanent colonel without
command.
But Leroy Watson was not a quitter. He asked to be retained
in the European Theater of Operations in a combat capacity, was
assigned to the 29th Division, became assistant division commander
and regained general officer rank and his second star later,
to serve in Japan. Both Eisenhower and Bradley had kind words
to say of him.
Mortain Counterattack
The Spearhead account relates that the action at Juvigny Ie
Tertre was "severe" and this is no mistake. General
Hickey had set up his headquarters in the basement of a home
belonging to a Dr. LeMonnier and sustained both artillery and
mortar fire. In addition, the Luftwaffe at night dropped heavy
bombs at the nearby crossroad. It was a prelude of what was to
come for Combat Command A and the 30th Infantry, which took the
place of it and the 1st Infantry Division.
Just before this, near Brecey, Colonel James Taylor, an old
cavalry officer and division trains commander, had slept in a
foxhole under a jeep trailer for protection. The next morning
he joined the lead troops and when peering around a tank, was
shot and killed by a sniper. He was not there in a tactical capacity.
It may be added here that the failure of the German army to
reach Avranches, thus splitting 1st and 3rd Armies, constituted
a turning point in the war. Not until the Bulge was he able to
make another concerted attack, and it brought the final failure.
German forces had massed troops, principally armor, and launched
an all out effort to the west. The intentions were to seize Avranches
and cut off the allied forces to the south from their supplies
coming in from the Normandy landing area. The main weight of
this attack fell on the 30th Infantry Division in the vicinity
of Mortain.
At 0245 on 7 August the counterattack first struck in force.
The 120th Infantry Regiment of the 30th Division was driven out
of Mortain, and before morning the attack had carried to Ie Mesnil
Tove. A complete battalion was cut off on a hill east of Mortain.
Combat Command B of the 3rd Armored Division had been fighting
continuously for 12 days and was just closing into what was to
be a rest and maintenance area in the vicinity of Refuvieille,
when word of the German counterattack was received. At 0730 on
7 August, Combat Command B was attached to the 30th Division,
and at 1050 orders were received to send out strong reconnaissance
forces to Ie Mesnil Adelee and Cuves.
The combat command was divided into four task forces for this
operation: Task Force 1 commanded by Colonel Roysdon; Task Force
2 commanded by Colonel Cornmog, Task Force 3 commanded by Lt.
Col. Hogan; Task Force Cabaniss commanded by Lieutenant Colonel
Cabaniss, and an artillery groupment commanded by Lieutenant
Colonel Garton.
By 1610 on 7 August the leading elements of Task Force 1 had
reached a point east of Ie Mesnil Adelee, and, since the infantry
following, did not come up, Task Force 1 was forced to dig in
and establish all-around defenses for the night. In the meantime,
Task Force 2, meeting light resistance on its reconnaissance
mission to Cuves, was pulled back and ordered to launch an attack
towards Juvigny Ie Tertre. Almost immediately this task force
ran into poor tank terrain and very heavy enemy resistance.
On 8 August Task Force 1 moved via Ie Mesnil Adelee to take
Ie Mesnil Tove. Task Force 1 was attached to the 119th Regimental
Combat Team and led the attack on Ie Mesnil Tove. Fierce fighting
followed, and losses on both sides were heavy. In general, the
mission was to seize and secure Ie Mesnil Tove, and to establish
a contact with the 8th Infantry Regiment which was pushing south.
The enemy was employing crack armored troops in an effort
to cut U.S. forces by a drive along the Cherence-le Roussel-le
Mesnil Adelee-Avranches corridor. Throughout the day heavy fighting
took place. Tanks fought where infantry might have done better.
Twice during the day the force suffered loss of ground, but by
nightfall contact had been made with the 8th Regimental Combat
Team at Cherence Ie Roussel. In the meantime, Task Force 3 was
moved to Ie Ments and placed on an alert to go to the aid of
either Task Force 1 or Task Force 2. The 83rd Armored Reconnaissance
Battalion outposted the combat command area to the south and
east.
Throughout the day and night of 9 August, Task Force 1, placed
well in front of the remainder of the 119th Regimental Combat
Team, to which this task force was attached, continued to hold
its ground at Ie Mesnil Tove, but was sustaining heavy casualties.
At daybreak Task Force 2 launched an attack via Juvigny Ie Terre
to establish a road block east of it. By early afternoon, the
mission was accomplished. The right flank of the 119th was contracted,
and Task Force 2 was also placed under control of the 119th Regimental
Combat Team. The south side of the German counterattack was now
shored up, and Task Force 3 of Combat Command B, with a battalion
of the 119th Infantry Regiment attached, was ordered to attack
to the east through the zone of the 120th Infantry Regiment and
then towards the north to seize the road junction north of Mortain.
By 1400, the force was rolling against light resistance and continued
until the turn north was made. At this point, they met the enemy
in strength. The task force commander out-maneuvered the enemy
tanks encountered and bypassed much of the resistance. Although
100 yards from the objective by late evening, the task force
went into a defensive posture for the night because of the stiff
German resistance. They were told to hold until relieved by the
12th Regimental Combat Team.
For the next two days and night fierce fighting went on continuously.
The task force was cut off on all sides for much of this time
and the relief unit was unable to make contact. After repeated
counterattacks were launched by the enemy, the task force continued
to hold its ground against superior forces. These battles played
a major part in disrupting the whole German counterattack. Be
sealing off the advance to the west. Task Forces 1 and 2 played
decisive roles.
When the enemy elected to drive to the south, the Germans
threatened to cut off Mortain and the vital supply links of the
1st U.S. Army, which had driven far to the south and to the east
of Mortain and was rolling towards Paris. Here Task Force 3 played
a major part. The enemy did everything to keep open the gap between
Task Force 3 and the supporting elements to the west and to keep
open the road leading through Mortain. Task Force 3 held its
ground in spite of the severe infantry losses and the loss of
23 tanks. By 12 August, the German counterattack had spent itself.
On 7 August Major General (then Brigadier General) Maurice
Rose took command of the 3rd Armored Division. By 12 August,
all units were again under division control. The strength of
the division was approximately:
Tanks..................93.5%
Artillery............. 100.0%
Other Vehicles.....99.0%
Officers...............91.3%
Enlisted Men.......96.4%
During all of the Mortain counterattack division headquarters
had been inoperative and did not have access to all records being
kept. Also, we have been fortunate to obtain postwar accounts
not to be had in the heat of combat and with those most concerned
busy fighting the war.
Colonel Ralph M. Rogers, for instance, S-3 of Combat Command
B, has his account:
"Combat Command A had seized Mortain, was relieved by
the 1st Infantry Division on 5 August, which in turn was relieved
by the 30th Infantry Division of 6 August. Combat Command B was
withdrawn to an assembly area west of Mortain for rest and maintenance
after 12 days of continuous combat.
"In the early morning hours of 7 August the Germans launched
a major counter-offensive through Mortain in the direction of
Avranches by elements of four divisions. The 120th Infantry Regiment
(30th Infantry Division) was driven from Mortain with heavy losses.
Combat Command B was attached to the 30th Infantry Division and
took up positions to block German movements to the west."
Subsequently General Hobbs organized his defense by attaching
two-thirds of the combat command strength of Combat Command B
to his 119th Infantry Regiment and ordering that positions would
be held at all cost and forbidding any vehicle movement.
During four days of fierce fighting heavy losses of men and material
were suffered, but the Germans were unsuccessful in moving further
to the west and began a withdrawal to the east on 12 August.
In this operation the armored vehicles of Combat Command B
had been used as immobile pill boxes susceptible to being picked
off one by one by German artillery and anti-tank guns which had
excellent observation of our positions. In commemoration of this
operation the 30th Infantry Division adopted the nickname of
"The Rock of Mortain". One infantry battalion was later
to receive a Presidential Citation for this action. To the men
of Combat Command B this seemed ironic, to say the least.
The following account contains details of some of the actions
in the fight, which was actually the last German attack before
the Ardennes. Of course, there was much fighting with German
troops trying to escape between Normandy and the German border
and defense action up until the Bulge, but no real attacks. Also
like the Bulge, in this action U.S. troops folded back on either
side of the penetration and the greater the penetration the more
exposed the enemy was.
What follows is a graphic account by Charles R. Corbin, who
was with the reconnaissance section of the 391st, which was with
Col. Hogan on the far side of the penetration. Tom Bell, who
was Hogan's tank gunner, remembers this action. He was with Hogan
in his tank when they received a radio message which required
decoding. The code book was in the halftrack, to the rear. Bell
crawled out and towards the halftrack and a German sniper put
a bullet through his trousers on the inside of his crotch about
10 inches below. It was a close shave.
100 Yards to Mortain 1944
by Charles R. Corbin
391st Armored Field Artillery Battalion
3rd Armored Division
I was in A Battery 391st RO (recon) section which had a jeep
and halftrack and seven to nine men. We like everyone else were
learning by our mistakes and pride was overcoming fear. We were
in the first week of August and our big assignment was helping
a company of infantrymen from the 4th Infantry Division take
an objective. Lieutenant Patterson, Sergeant Marik and I packed
our jeep radio and went on foot with them. We provided artillery
and reached our objective after getting pinned down in a barn
or horse stable.
Then we got a call to report back to go to the 1st Infantry
Division. When we arrived back we learned our jeep driver, Robert
Horton, and Jean Parenteau had been killed by an artillery shell
and put our jeep out of action.
By 7 August, we were with Combat Command B again and the 30th
Infantry Division to halt a counterattack near Le Mesnil Tove
and Mortain. After reaching our objective on 9 August we were
ordered to join Task Force 3, whose mission was to take the high
ground north of Mortain, to control the crossroads to Mortain.
We hit heavy resistance about 300 yards from our objective and
the command made plans to go up a hedgerow lane, out left into
a field and go through the next hedgerow.
Lieutenant Patterson told our driver, John Manual, to follow
the first tank when it made a hole with its blade. We tried to
do this twice as the tanks were hit by anti-tank fire. Lieutenant
Cooper of I Company pulled up beside us in his tank and while
waiting for another hole to be made he joking, said "Wouldn't
it be nice to get a million dollar wound and get the hell out
of here?" His tank passed us by and was also hit trying
to break out of the hedgerow. I could feel the heat of the next
shell as we backed up. I saw two tankers get out of the tank
and pull Lieutenant Cooper out and carry him past us. He didn't
seem to be seriously wounded. I waved to him.
The other tanks had coiled in the field and the German 88
that had been waiting for us cut loose, also mortar, artillery
and machine guns pounded our tanks and infantry. The tank next
to us went up in flames and a tanker was having trouble getting
out. Another tanker jumped on the tank and tried to help but
was hit by a bullet. Then a shell beheaded the tanker. At this
point we bailed out of the halftrack. I was between two infantrymen
and a shell landed behind us and seriously wounded the two of
them, although I thought they were both dead. The rest of the
30th Infantry retreated. All or most of our tanks had been hit
and what men could get out retreated back to the next hedgerow.
A piece of shrapnel hit our driver in the arm and I helped him
back.
All of our men were accounted for except Lieutenant Patterson,
who was kneeling over the two infantrymen near our halftrack.
I waved for him to come back but he waved for me to come to him.
He had administered first aid to them and was giving them some
morphine shots. We loaded and strapped one man on the left fender
and I held the other man on the right fender as he drove the
halftrack to safety. We came out on the losing end and with many
dead and wounded and 15 of our 17 tanks knocked out. A corporal
left was the highest ranking man. It was one hell of a battle
witnessed by this 19 year old kid.
We moved our halftrack in the field to the right of the small
lane, crawled under and started digging, but it was rocky. A
message came in on our radio for Colonel Hogan, who had set up
in the field opposite us and I started out when the shells were
coming in, again I hit the ground and noticed Leo Zemitus walking
around. He told me, "If you are going to get hit it has
your name on it." He was with our A Battery B.C. party with
Hogan. I made it to Colonel Hogan's halftrack as another barrage
came in. Hogan and crew had soft ground or they must have dug
a hole and pulled the track over it and it was deep, as they
were all in the hole. I gave the message to Colonel Hogan, was
half way back when I saw a medic with Zemitus, a piece of shrapnel
had passed through his arm. That night the Germans crept in Hogan's
field and tried to throw hand grenades under the vehicles, but
were shot.
In the morning of 10 August an attack was made down the lane
by the 30th Infantry with Lieutenant Patterson and Sergeant Marik,
but it failed and very few returned. I saw a medic leading a
man with his chin cut off and another with his arm hanging in
his sleeve, also a sergeant who although not wounded was in terrible
shape. Patterson and Marik were okay.
On the morning of the 11th, elements of Combat Command B broke
through to us and another attack was made to the right of our
halftrack. The tank Hot Hedy appeared and a M5 from headquarters
of the 391st forward observer (section) with Bill Fullerton,
Summers, Sergeant Ray Pierce and 1st Lieutenant John Forston,
to give artillery support for another company of 30th Infantry
Division. The Germans were waiting for them as they got the next
hedgerow and let loose with artillery and machine gun fire. I
was in the hole under our halftrack as a 2nd lieutenant knelt
and waved his men forward and as they passed our halftrack they
were mowed down. The man retreated and brought in the dead and
wounded.
An all-out attack was planned for the next morning. Lieutenant
Patterson and Sergeant Marik crawled down our hedgerow and crossed
over and picked out some targets on the crossroad for the next
morning, saw one German run into a house and blew it up with
our artillery. Our tanks were getting ready to lead us in the
morning. That night while on guard duty something caused me to
freeze in my tracks and I couldn't move. It was an unfamiliar
sound that turned out to be a buzz bomb.
That evening and night the Germans pulled out and we were
able to go 100 yards and reach our objective.
We turned around and headed to help close the Falaise Gap.
It was good to be on the road again after spending three nights
the same hole under the halftrack. I was thinking of Lieutenant
Cooper and beginning to wish I was him.
Unknown to us at the time, the delay in the counterattack
follow-up scheduled for 9 August was caused by the Canadians
of Montgomery's Army Group pressing towards Falaise.
Also, during this period, we were holding the door open for
Patton's 3rd Army to pass to our rear for a guided tour, guests
of the Free French of the Interior, of Brittany.
And all the while our army commander, Omar Bradley, was sitting
back there like a poker player with an ace in the hole, with
full knowledge of what the Germans were doing and intending to
do through decoding of German messages through their Enigma machine
cracked at Bletchley Park in England by Ultra Secret.
[END of Charles Corbin's account]
The Death of Colonel Cornog
One of the most devastating losses incurred by the 36th Armored
Infantry Regiment of the 3rd Armored Division in World War II,
certainly to the command structure, was the loss of its commander
Colonel William W. Cornog, Jr. on 9 August 1944 near Ie Mesnil
Tove, along with key members of his staff, this at a crucial
moment in the blunting of the German drive to reach Avranches
begun 7 August on direct orders from Hitler, a counterattack
which would have divided the U.S. 1st Army if successful and
that of General George Patton's 3rd Army, then conducting, what
in essence was, an unguided tour of Brittany.
Cormog's death came at a time when the 3rd Armored, in addition
to taking part in what was probably the greatest breakout of
the war, was undergoing various changes of command which for
inexperienced troops would have been crippling, but the fighting
never stopped. Cornog himself had succeeded Colonel Graeme G.
Parks on 18 July 1944 prior to the massive bombardment of the
Marigny-St. Gilles area of 26 July, leading to the breakout,
but after the events coming after the crossing of the Vire River
at Aire and the taking of Hauls Vents on 10 July by Colonel Roysdon's
indomitable task force and Combat Command A's capture of St.
Jean de Daye the following day.
But to the GI in the line these changes in the command made
little difference and the fighting never stopped. There was,
though, hope for a pause, rest, and maintenance for Combat Command
B on 7 August, when grouped near Refuvielle, the Germans launched
their attack upon Mortain.
The deepest thrust made by the Germans was by the 2nd Panzer
Division of XL VII Corps, part of the 7th Army, it making a penetration
from just north of Mortain to below Ie Mesnil Tove to Ie Mesnil
Adelee and were scheduled to attack toward Avranches and the
sea on August 9th, but the preceding day our pressure brought
a slight pull-back for counterattacks near Ie Mesnil Tove and
Cherence.
Meeting this, and on the south side of the German thrust was
Combat Command B, with Colonel Cornog's Task Force 2 consisting
of the following:
- 2nd Battalion, 36th Armored Infantry Regiment 2nd Battalion,
33rd Armored Regiment
- Company A, 83rd Reconnaissance 1st Platoon, Company B,
703rd Tank Destroyer Battalion
- 2nd Platoon, Company C, 703rd Tank Destroyer Battalion
- 2nd Platoon, Company B, 23rd Armored Engineer Battalion
- Plus medical and maintenance detachments, according to Spearhead
in the West.
Task Force 2's objective on 8 August was to put in a roadblock
east of Juvigny Ie Tertre and their advance roughly paralleled
that of the 2nd Panzer Division, but in the other direction.
This they did by early afternoon and made contact with the 119th
Regiment of the 30th Infantry Division, to which it was attached.
In the meantime. Colonel Royston's Task Force 1 had made contact
with the 8th Regimental Combat Team at Cherence. Task Force 3
-Lieutenant Colonel Hogan - attacked the road junction north
of Mortain and after heavy fighting got within 100 yards of his
objective, then leagued.
As recounted in SPEARHEAD, for the next two days and nights
fighting went on continuously. Or, as Blumenson put it in Breakout
and Pursuit, "Essentially the battle was small unit
combat, 'infiltration and counter infiltration', close-ranging
fighting by splinter groups maneuvering to outflank and in turn
being outflanked, a 'seesawing activity consisting of minor penetrations
by both sides' operations characterized by ambush and surprise
and fought on a level often no higher than that of the individual
soldier."
The terrain was precipitous and much wooded, with the See
River, running generally east and west and a little south of
the villages of Cherence, Cuves and Brecey. It was not tank country.
So much for background.
But let us consider the character of Colonel Cornog. Here
is what Paul Corrigan (Headquarter/ 36th) recalls: "Colonel
Cornog was a big fellow, huge. He had a constant worry that his
battalion was not moving fast enough. This may account for his
being up where he perhaps should not have been."
Marsh Reed (Headquarter/36th) has this recollection: "I
will look into my records - and try to give you the information
regarding Colonel 'Jug' Cornog. Also, what I can find about a
great man, Lieutenant Colonel Vincent E. Cockefair. As I recall,
both of these events were more or less at the same time, where
the commanding officer had called a meeting of their commanding
officers into a farm building (out building). And when the last
man reported in, the location was hit, and all or most of those
present were killed or very seriously wounded. James S. Alien
(E/36th) was very seriously wounded."
Harvey K. Bubenzer, Jr. of Bunkie, LA, then battalion supply
officer, has some vivid recollections of the event. According
to him, Colonel Cornog had called a unit commanders meeting during
daylight hours in a little building on a hillside near Ie Mesnil
Tove or above Juvigny with those present numbering-Lieutenant
Colonel Vincent E. Cockefair of the 2nd Battalion, a 1st Lieutenant
William Giles of D Company and Apple Springs, Texas, Lieutenant
Walter May of Ohio, commanding the mortar platoon and Captain
James B. Nixon. All were standing when a German shell came through
the door and either killed or wounded all present except May.
Paul Corrigan said, "My recollections surrounding the
death of Lieutenant Colonel Vincent Cockefair and others is very
vague, but I do recall this: I was in a large foxhole, in a farmyard,
I believe, when someone came to me with an order to take my little
battle group to where Cockefair had been killed. It was night
time. I responded that I would not or could not go with halftracks,
but I would organize an infantry foot group and go. Before I
did anything I was told to stay put. As I recall I looked at
a map and believed I was six to eight miles back, perhaps not
this much. Captain Jim Nixon was hit the same time and died later.
Doc Cohen visited him in the hospital. I was commanding the 1st
Battalion, then Lieutenant Colonel Abney having been relieved
when Colonel Parks was let go."
Corrigan's decision not to use halftracks is reinforced by
Bubenzer who says the Germans could detect when the starter on
a motor became operative, by sound alone or locating device he
does not know, but shellfire came in accurately whenever a motor
was started. So exposed was the position -- Bubenzer says that
all tanks, halftracks and motor vehicles were withdrawn and it
was a purely infantry action - that dead and wounded could not
be evacuated or supplies brought up during daylight hours and
that at night he took four jeeps forward with supplies and to
evacuate the casualties, but rather than use the starter on the
jeeps, they were pushed off until the motor caught.
Among those not present at the commanding officer's meeting
was the executive officer of the 2nd Battalion 36th, Major Albert
L. Robinett, according to Bubenzer.
As to the danger of approaching the combat area, Bubenzer
says he was advised by Lieutenant Colonel William B. Lovelady,
Commanding Officer 2nd Battalion of the 33rd Armored Regiment,
no stranger to danger, not to go forward.
As to the placing of a command post in the safest possible
place, Bubenzer says that Lieutenant Colonel Jack Hutcheson,
executive officer of the 36th, who took command of the battalion
on the death of Cockefair, dug a foxhole and placed a top on
it for the command post.
The days from 7 August through the 11th of 1944 will not soon
be forgotten by those present and survived. George D. McLemore
of Greenwood, MS, who begins talking about these events by saying
that it was a long time ago and memory has dimmed, when recounting
the action becomes animated and his memory astonishingly good.
At the beginning of the action, he recalls, he and his men
- he was a staff sergeant - were bunched up in a sunken road
behind the hut in which Colonel Cornog was killed. The hut, he
says, was not "much more than a chicken coop," a larger
structure nearby having been demolished by shellfire. The company
commander. Captain Nixon had come by and told them to get out
in the open and scatter out so one shell burst would not hit
all of them, so they deployed around a garden near the hut.
Back of the hut and forward of the sunken road was a wheat
field. These were on the forward slope of a hill. Behind this
was a stream, about which more later.
At the time the shell struck the hut, killing Colonel Cornog
and others Tech Sergeant Norman Kruse, Indiana, had just stepped
outside and was spared. Kruse replaced Lieutenant John E. Wooten,
who was wounded, as an F Company platoon leader.
Worst of the "incoming mail," according to McLemore,
were the large German rockets, saying "they tore our ass
off." It was, he said, "the most sensitive position
we were in," and he was in the preceding breakout and later
in the Falaise Gap action and later wounded -- he lost a leg
-- 17 September in the action in penetrating the Siegfried Line.
By "sensitive" he means that a puff of cigarette
smoke in the wheat field would bring in enemy fire. Men laid
there all day eating K rations and later one man would take about
five canteens to the before mentioned stream for water. Later
they found one very dead German soldier and a dead cow on the
stream, but it was the only water available.
As the fighting progressed and casualties mounted McLemore
found he was the senior non-com unscathed in the company and
all officers either killed or wounded, making him company commander.
In this capacity he worked back to the sunken road and liaised
with infantrymen of the 30th Infantry Division on his left flank
and on his return encountered a Lieutenant O'Brien of Syracuse,
New York, who stated, "I'm looking for F Company. I'm the
new company commander."
"I'm glad to see you and you sure as hell are welcome
to it." McLemore replied. O'Brien, he said, was a "ninety
day wonder" but a good fellow and said, "You have been
in combat and if I do anything wrong tell me about it."
McLemore's reply was very much in the affirmative. O'Brien was
killed two or three days later and by the time McLemore was wounded
the company had had six commanding officers.
"One hundred and seventy-two men and five officers went
on that hill for three days," McLemore said, "and 48
came off from F Company." During the entire war 122 men
from this company were killed and there were 840 replacements,
he recounted, making F Company the sustainer of more casualties
than any other company in the division. While Task Force 2's
action toward Ie Mesnil Tove resolved into an infantry holding
action, where were the tanks?
Sergeant Shelton C. Picard of D Company, 33rd Armored Regiment
has an account of it as to the limited action by tanks in this
action.
"On 9 August 1944, on a Tuesday, I was ordered by Lieutenant
Colonel Lovelady to report to a Lieutenant Colonel Cockefair
and a Colonel Cornog," Picard relates, "at a certain
location in the Mortain valley. After I reached that location,
I was reached via radio and asked to meet Colonel Cornog at a
shack in a wooded area approximately a quarter mile from my location.
"I made my way back to this shack on foot, and I was
receiving small arms fire all the way. I was asked not to use
my tank as any movement would draw artillery fire. When I reached
this shack Colonel Cornog, Lieutenant Colonel Cockefair and a
field officer from the 391st (Armored Field Artillery Battalion)
were in the shack.
"I was ordered by Colonel Cornog to pull my tanks to
the edge of a small community and to set everything on the site
on fire, using white phosphorous ammo, and to destroy the church
steeple, as we felt they were observing us from some high point.
"As I left the shack and got about 100 yards away, a
direct artillery shell hit the shack, and I was later informed
that everyone inside had been killed."
"I walked back to my tank platoon and accomplished the
mission given me. At approximately 10:00 p.m. on 9 August 1944,
my platoon was relieved by an infantry company and was asked
to remain in position until further orders. I remained there
until finally relieved on 11 August 1944 and returned to my unit.
"Colonel Cornog, Lieutenant Colonel Cockefair and a forward
observer for the 391st Field Artillery were killed on 9 August
1944 at approximately 4:00 p.m. The artillery shell that hit
the shack had to be a delayed fuse shell as it had to go through
a lot of tree limbs before hitting the shack."
"Thank the Good Lord that I had just walked out."
Lieutenant Colonel William B. Lovelady, who commanded the
2nd Battalion of the 33rd Armored Regiment, not only confirmed
Picard's account, but said that he had cooperated with Colonel
Cornog in sending Picard's platoon forward but was in the 36th
Armored Infantry Regiment's command post when Colonel Edwin M.
Sutherland, Commanding Officer of the 119th Infantry Regiment,
30th Division, to which Task Force 2 was attached, called and
said that he didn't want any tanks forward in this action and
a radio message went to Picard to pull back.
On hearing of the death of Cornog, Lovelady then told Major
Jack Hutcheson, regimental executive officer of the 36th to go
forward and Hutcheson got in his jeep and went.
Lovelady also related that Colonel Sutherland, with whom he
had combat experience previously in the taking of Hauts Vents
on and around 10 July, had a command post on 9 August which consisted
of a dugout covered by lots of dirt in a field so positioned
that "if you didn't know where it was it was hard to find."
Cornog should have had one.
While service manuals had prescribed placing a command post
on the forward slope of a hill, the necessities of battle had
ruled otherwise. Andrew Barr has supplied the following documentation:
"From the 36th Armored Regiment diary of 9 August 1944:
Forward elements in the vicinity of Mortain with the town being
in the hands of the enemy. Fierce fighting against fanatical
resistance was encountered. Artillery and mortar fire was extremely
heavy. Both infantry and tanks suffered many casualties. Colonel
Cornog and Lieutenant Colonel Cockefair were killed in action."
Barr relates that the story is also told in Baton Roberts
Five Stars to Victory on pages 30-31, as follows: Colonel
Cornog, commanding the 36th Armored Infantry Regiment, held an
officers' meeting at his command post, an ancient stone house.
As the officers' peeps drove nearby, they must have been observed,
because even before they were all assembled, excruciatingly accurate
artillery fire crept up, ladder-fashion, upon the doomed building.
As the dust cleared, frantic radio pleas for medics indicated
a disaster. Both Colonel Cornog and Lieutenant Colonel Cockefair
were killed. The "F" Company was killed and several
other key men wounded.
The regimental diary also relates that Lieutenant Colonel
William B. Lovelady, the tank commander, took command of the
troops but it must have been temporary pending the arrival of
Jack Hutcheson, the regimental executive officer.
Captain William Cohen of Trenton, New Jersey, was the medical
officer with Cornog's task forces and he described the action
of that day as "the worst in my life."
He remembers the site of the action as being on the side of
a hill facing another hill on the far side of a stream, the area
of the task force being a cleared one with trees on either side.
Again and again he mentioned the heat and dust of that day,
enervating heat and dust from vehicles immediately bringing in
behind it shellfire from the enemy. Every time a vehicle went
through Juvigny there came a shell burst.
Cohen had moved his command post in with Sergeant Strickland,
who was with a captain with service company of the 2nd Battalion
of the 36th -- Cockefair's unit.
George Gates, of the 2nd Battalion with Colonel Roysdon, two
days before had his aid station hit and he evacuated it and returned
to the medical company on orders of Colonel Salmon, the division
surgeon. Thus medical personnel in the area were stretched thin.
On approaching Cockefairs's command post Captain Cohen took
his dental people with him, leaving his section on the road to
the rear for safety and to avoid stirring up dust. He, with Sergeant
Strickland, went down a dusty path toward the commanding post
when the shelling began. This occurred on either side of the
noon hour, either late morning or early in the afternoon. When
the shelling began Strickland, who was six feet six inches, jumped
the hedgerow for safety while Dr. Cohen "flopped in a bed
of nettles." On arising and proceeding they got to the cleared
area in the woods on the downhill slope of the hill facing the
Germans on the other side.
"As soon as I arrived casualties began to arrive,"
Cohen said. "Jimmy Alien had a huge gash in his knee. Seven
officers were killed, one a forward observer for the 391st Armored
Field Artillery Battalion."
"I was dressing Alien's knee in the middle of the afternoon,"
he continued, "when I was called and told Cornog had been
brought in. Captain Ted Bernstein was working on him with medics,
all of us working on the ground. His right arm was off and the
wound extended into the shoulder and right side and he was in
shock, but inquired as to how Cockefair and the others were doing."
"I told him," Cohen said, "that they were being
taken care of. His axillary artery was pulsating, but severed
and not bleeding and he was being given plasma. I returned to
Alien and in ten minutes or so they came and told me he had died.
I did not at that time know about Cockefair."
"Later I found that a shell had come in the doorway of
the small hut in which the command group had been meeting, striking
Cockefair. Colonel Salmon and I saw his pelvis the next day at
the hut, which had been on fire, and it was no larger than a
child's. We identified him by his wallet, which escaped the fire."
But following the death of Colonel Cornog, Cohen and the medic
were evacuating the wounded by half track when a camouflage net
became entangled in the tracks and caught fire, adding to the
trials of the day.
"When I got back to my section," he continued, "I
found poor Bernstein working with half a section, much overworked,
and a shell had hit the back of a halftrack. Tork had his leg
amputated. First Sergeant Scheibel had been hit, our clerk Bero,
was hit in the leg and dental technician Misichko was also hit
in the leg. Ilkanic was unharmed, having left shortly before
the shell hit."
"The 1st Sergeant, clerk and dental technician were evacuated
with the driver and the next day at the field hospital I was
told they had all been evacuated. There I saw Captain Nixon,
the frontal bones of his head entirely gone but his brain still
functioning. He died two hours later. The evacuation nurse at
the hospital gave me a shot of whiskey from her own supply to
carry me over."
Later, Cohen recalled, Bero went AWOL from a replacement depot
to return to the 45th, then in Germany, while Sergeant Strickland
got ulcers and the medics scrounged to obtain milk for him. For
his work with the wounded at this action Captain William Cohen
received the Silver Star.
One officer, Captain Grady Wheeler, who back at the division
headquarters was thought to have been wounded at the time of
Colonel Cornog's death, was not among those present. Wheeler,
who had been aide de camp to General Watson and was formerly
of C Company, 36th, had been assigned to his old unit and was
struck in the leg by shell fragments before he could reach the
command post.
From the preceding one might think that all the mail was incoming,
other than Picard's use of white phosphorous tank fire, but this
is not the case.
Lieutenant Colonel George G. Garton, the big, plump, bald
headed, cigar smoking, whiskey drinking (when the occasion was
right), confident commanding officer of the 391st Armored Field
Artillery Battalion groupment (more than one battalion) saw to
it that the outgoing artillery fire would make life a living
hell for the Germans. According to the division history his groupment
consisted of his 391st plus the 87th Armored Field Artillery
Battalion and Batteries A and D of the 466 AAA Battalion. The
diary of the 391st shows that the 58th Armored Field Artillery
Battalion was subsequently attached to the groupment and that
he fired support, for Cornog's Task Force 2, Colonel Roysdon's
Task Force 1 around Ie Mesnil Tove, and Lieutenant Colonel Sam
Hogan's later drive on the southernmost route to isolate Mortain
as well as the 30th Division. When the action started 7 August,
the groupment was in position north of Reffuveille, cleaning
clothes, servicing equipment and the 87th Armored Field Artillery
Battalion was relieved.
Closing the Falaise Gap
On 12 August 1944 the 3rd Armored Division moved into new
assembly areas west of Mayenne, France, and prepared to attack
to the northeast the following day.
The British, driving south from Caen and the American 1st
Army, pushing eastward, had created a potential trap around a
considerable portion of Field Marshal von Klude's 7th Army. The
escape gap of this trap later became defined between Falaise
and Argentan. The 3rd Armored Division was going to be in at
the kill.
Division Field Order Number 6 fixed the axis of advance: Mayenne,
Pre-en-Pail, Carrouges, Ranes. On 13 August the area between
Pre-enPail and Ranes became a battle area. There were no particular
front lines, and contact was everywhere. The road from Carrouges
to Ranes was littered with both German and American tanks and
other equipment destroyed in the running fight.
On 14 August, Task Force X attempted to extend their position
to the north but were unsuccessful. Task Force Y attempted to
join Task Force X at Ranes. They met strong resistance at Joue
du Bois and Ranes by dark.
Joue du Bois was assigned as an objective for Division Reserve.
Operations against this town were not completed until elements
of the 9th Infantry Division relieved elements of the 3rd Armored
Division.
On 15 August fighting continued to be heavy. At the close
of the day the entire division was in a tight position around
Ranes. Combat Command A was sent toward Fromentel and had not
progressed much beyond the outskirts of Ranes, but 500 more prisoners
were taken.
The next morning, 16 August, the 3rd Armored launched a coordinated
attack toward Fromentel. By the afternoon there was fighting
on the outskirts of the town. By dark Task Force 1 had reached
Les Yveteauxjust southwest of Fromentel. Fifteen enemy tanks
were destroyed and 400 more prisoners were taken.
During the day of 17 August, Combat Command A fought its way
into Fromentel from the east. Task Force 1 of Combat Command
B attempted to launch an attack on Fromentel from the southwest
in conjunction with Combat Command A's attack, but such heavy
resistance was met that the town itself was not reached. At about
1700 when all but the western part of the town had been cleared
of the enemy, flights of P-38s heavily bombed Fromentel. Combat
Command A was forced to withdraw because of the bombing, and
small forces of Germans reoccupied the center and western parts
of the town. At 1900 Company C of the 32nd Armored Regiment was
sent into Fromentel, and the friendly planes made the mistake
that they were German tanks. Even with the bombing the eastern
part of the town was retained by Combat Command A.
Task Force 2, the half of Combat Command B, attached
to seize the high ground at la Pierre Hurel - Mesnil Jean. This
task force fought stubborn resistance all day. At 1600 they got
across the railroad east of Fromentel, seized Hill 216 south
of Putanges, and remained for the night just south of their objective.
Task Force Hogan from Division Reserve in conjunction with
elements of the 83rd Armored Reconnaissance Battalion protected
the division's right flank by seizing the road junction west
of Ecouche. During the day, as for days previously, the German
Army streamed south and east between Falaise and Argentan. About
1200 enemy vehicles passed the front of the 3rd Armored Division
that day receiving artillery fire and attack from the air all
the way.
A coordinated attack by Combat Command B gained the objective
at Putanges on 18 August. At 1237 that day Sergeant Donald Ekdahl
of the 33rd Armored Regiment met advance elements of British
armor on the road near Putanges. Other such meetings occurred
to the 3rd's right and left. The so-called Falaise Gap was closed.
The operation was more accurately described as a "squeeze-play,"
since the enemy, by fanatical and skillful rearguard action,
succeeded in keeping his escape routes open until the major portion
of his force were extricated from the potential trap.
The whole battle of Ranes - Fromentel was close-in fighting
with a "fluid front." Tanks and tank destroyers had
many engagements at ranges less than 100 yards. Elements of the
division frequently found themselves engaged in stiff fights
on ground already passed over by other elements of the division.
The enemy was everywhere, and frequently had no idea where American
troops were, hence many surprise engagements were fought.
Although Major General Maurice Rose was given command of the
3rd Armored on 7 August, it was not until we were reassembled
in the Mayenne area on 12 August that he actually assumed command.
It took no time at all to learn who was in command, and so it
continued.
The Falaise Gap action was his first combat with the division
and our first experience of him. Division command post for the
period 15-17 August was three miles south of Ranes and afforded
us a ringside seat for the bombing of the German columns retreating
to the east. Their exodus was liken to a pack of rats fleeing
a burning house and their actions as ferocious. After we had
done our part in closing our portion of the gap, the bodies of
several of our men were found, hands tied behind their back and
shot -- executed while prisoners of war. This was reported to
the inspector general, but no publicity resulted. This was the
first discovered but not the last one of men taken prisoner from
our division being slain.
Also, for the first and only time, we had the Free French
2nd Armored Division on our right flank. Although road access
had been directed by the army, they, being in their own country,
decided this did not apply to them. Confusion resulted. The French
were equipped with U.S. material and, for the most part, wore
uniforms supplied by us, except for their caps. In their division
headquarters no helmets were worn, but the cap of the unit to
which the individual belonged. There were a lot of hats. They
also fired their artillery into our zone. But they came to fight,
at least until they got to Paris.
U.S. 7th Army had landed on the south coast of France beginning
on 15 August, and this was further impetus for a withdrawal toward
the Third Reich.
There arose a situation at the Falaise Gap which has been
much discussed. The rightness or wrongness of what actually happened
will not be addressed here, but what we perceived to have happened.
At this time Bernard Law Montgomery still had command over all
allied land forces and would have through the end of the month.
Back in Normandy, from the beginning, phase lines had been shown
on the larger situation maps, denoting points of advance hoped
to be obtained by a certain date. The British were supposed to
have taken Caen, for instance, on D-day and obviously did not.
We Americans were, until the breakout, behind schedule. However,
reaching the Paris area was shown to be about Christmas time,
and we of the 3rd Armored crossed the Seine beginning 25 August.
But one is ahead of the story. Laying out of boundary lines
between army groups was obviously the prerogative of the overall
Land Commander Montgomery. Thus he had laid down a stop line
for U.S. troops facing him in the gap area. We reached our stop
line and the British had not reached theirs. Permission was sought
to move our stop line forward and thus inflict more damage on
the enemy. Montgomery would not give permission. And that is
what we believed at the time.
General Rose, in establishing his domination over us, relieved
Colonel Dorrance S. Roysdon for tardiness in crossing the railway
line fronting Combat Command B. Some of us, considering his prior
action at Haut Vents in hedgerow country, found this severe.
For those who put the "stopper" in the pincher jug,
the Poles for the British and the 90th Infantry Division for
the Americans, we had much sympathy.
90-Degree Shift Towards Mons, Belgium
Following the Falaise Gap fighting, it was a welcome relief
for the division to have a momentary rest in the area between
Dreux and Chartres, as explained below. We were out of the hedgerow
country and into fertile open country, among wheat fields with
the sun shining.
Paris was there for the taking, but not by us. But when orders
came, we were shifted north of Paris. We crossed the Seine between
Corbeil and Melun, where a bridge had been made.
The accounts from Spearhead and Captain A. Eaton Roberts's
Five Starts to Victory, (Task Force Lovelady) detail,
as much as possible, what happened, but not entirely why.
One advantage, besides the more open country and sun, was
being accompanied by Thunderbolts flying in threes near the head
of our columns. We found they could skipbomb German tanks.
When we left the Falaise area we found, to our rear, about
a four inch gasoline pipeline. It was an extension of the one
crossing the English channel, making delivery of fuel a reality.
But we soon outran that.
Typical of our fast march through northern France was the
possibility of encountering scattered German troops willing to
fight. Division headquarters (forward) found this out the morning
of 28 August when a German AA unit tried to creep through our
CP, spread on either side of the road. They did not make it.
But from a command and intelligence standpoint, the most memorable
event of this drive was when, on the last day of August, with
five columns launched east toward Charleville-Mezieres and some
in contact with the enemy, all were stopped by radio on orders
from VII Corps, General Rose brought to the command post, he
was forward again, and the entire division turned a quarter circle
left, toward Mons. Execution of this order was perfect.
But why? We only knew we were so ordered. Since it has been
found, years later, that it was the positive result of interception
of German radio messages and their prompt decoding at Bletchely
Park, England, with the Ultra Secret use of the German Enigma
machine. As Max Hastings has pointed out that Ultra was not a
magic key, but was erratic and incomplete as to information gained;
however, in this case it hit the spot. Once the Germans got on
their own soil radio traffic decreased and land lines and courier
delivery of secret messages prevailed, being one reason why the
Ardennes offensive in December came as such a surprise to many.
However, as Winston Churchill said, ours was a secret war.
Here it might be added, in campaigning with Maurice Rose one
did not have a nine to five job, not only that, we did not necessarily
stop at sundown when moving, or for a hot meal. After all, we
had a lot of K rations in our vehicles.
While the German 7th Army was being pummeled in the Falaise-Argentan
area, the armor of the American 3rd Army was running almost at
will over western France, and by long hops, had reached the Seine
south of Paris.
The 3rd Armored Division completed its part in the mopping
up of the Ranes-Fromentel area on 19 August and spent 20 and
21 August in maintenance and refitting in assembly area south
of Fromentel. Then, on 22 August a long and uneventful march
brought the division to a new assembly area in the vicinity of
Courville and Chateauneuf between Dreux and Chartres. On the
24th another march brought the division to Corbeil and Melun,
where they prepared to cross the Seine River.
The 1st and 9th Infantry Divisions closed into assembly areas
near the 3rd Armored and prepared to follow the advance of the
3rd across the Seine. These three divisions of VII Corps were
soon to be referred to by many as the "1st Team of the 1st
Army." This team led the 1st Army's pursuit of the defeated
German forces from the Seine through Mons and to the Siegfried
Line in 18 days.
Spearheading this historic drive, the 3rd Armored Division
crossed the Seine River at Tilly just south of Corbeil. Crossing
started on the night of 25 August. Spreading into multiple columns
on 26 August the division cracked through the shell that the
enemy was holding stubbornly around the 4th Infantry and 7th
Armored Divisions' bridgehead east of the Seine, and moved swiftly
to the east and northeast. The enemy was withdrawing too rapidly
to offer strong resistance, but was found on all routes holding
road blocks at all favorable points. The Germans opened fire
on the armored columns from concealed positions only to be quickly
overrun or bypassed, contained and left to be dealt with by closely
following infantry. The armored columns moved on at maximum speed,
and the 1st and 9th Infantry Divisions followed the "Spearhead"
generally abreast of each other, the 1st Division on the left.
On 27 August, the 3rd Armored reached the Mame River at La
Ferte Sous Jouarre where both combat commands crossed on existing
bridges. There had been brief fighting for Meaux and Coulommiers.
Upon completion of the crossing, Combat Command A and Combat
Command B started moving again in task force columns toward their
respective objectives of Pont d'Arcy and Soissons to seize and
secure the crossings of the Aisne River at those locations.
Driving at such speed soon brought the 3rd into the heart
of the enemy's communications zone. Near Soissons and Braisne,
elements of the division destroyed three railway trains which
were evacuating personnel and equipment to move east. The passage
through the towns and villages so quickly evacuated by the Wehrmacht
was slowed markedly by milling crowds who swarmed on and about
the vehicles in delirious exhibitions of happiness.
On 28 August, the Aisne River crossings at both Soissons and
Pont d'Arcy were seized intact.
It was here that General Rose, usually with the leading elements
of the division, crossed one of the bridges suspected of being
damaged to check its condition. A few mines had to be lifted
from the approaches and the existing spans strengthened. There
was increased enemy resistance along the Aisen.
The Aisen bridgehead was expanded and secured on 29-30 August
by first seizing the high ground north of the river and then
pushing out to the northeast.
On the high ground just across from Soissons to the left of
the division sector, there were extensive reinforced concrete
fortifications. A considerable amount of detailed information
concerning these fortifications was furnished by Free French
of Interior troops in the area; however, no trouble developed
from the fortifications. The enemy was not given time to occupy
and defend the area.
Troops of the "Spearhead" Division securing Soissons
and the river crossings were relieved of these duties early in
the morning of 30 August by infantry elements that had come up
during the night, but even with this increase in available fighting
strength, the 3rd Armored had a rather broad front to cover in
securing the proposed bridgehead. The bridgehead line was seized
on 30 August and firmly held.
Without waiting to be relieved on the bridgehead line by the
infantry divisions that were following, the 3rd Armored Division
was assembled in preparation for another push to its objective,
Sedan and Charleville. Five routes were assigned for this advance,
which began on the morning of 31 August 1944.
As on previous occasions, the enemy used the hours of darkness,
while the 3rd was halted, to build up a thin screen of resistance
with the mission of delaying the advance of the American armor.
When the attack started on the morning of 31 August, this initial
resistance was quickly overcome and a rapid advance was made
throughout the morning.
As the advance continued instructions were received to change
the direction of attack from east to north. The objective assigned
the 3rd Armored was to secure Mons. New routes of advance were
through Hirson and Vervins.
When orders directing a change in mission and route of advance
were received by the different combat elements of the 3rd Armored
Division, many had to disengage from the enemy and turn north.
When night came the combat commands and Division Reserve were
again in contact with even stronger enemy forces than those met
during the morning, but had made good progress toward the new
objective.
A number of enemy columns were spotted by or called to the
attention of supporting aircraft who worked them over well. Combat
Command A reached Avesnes. Combat Command B worked north through
Vervins, passed la Capelle and reached a position west of Avesnes
by night. Combat Command R reached and held Hirson.
During the night Combat Command B was cut off from its service
elements and did not receive its fuel and lubricants until the
morning of 2 September. Supplies had to be fought forward. The
circumstance caused a delay in Combat Command B' s resuming the
attack on 2 September, but the other two combat commands started
early. Moderate opposition of all arms was encountered. The Belgium
border was within sight.
Next Chapter: Belgium to the German Border
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