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3AD Enters Germany - September 12, 1944
At 1451 hours September 12, 1944 a platoon from the recon
company of the 33rd Armored Regiment crossed the German border,
followed instantly by the main body of Task Force Lovelady, entering
and taking Roetgen, the first town captured in Germany by allied
forces.
On September 1st SHAEF came into being, placing all land forces
under Eisenhower, with Montgomery reverting to commander of 21st
Army Group alone. SHAEF's headquarters were then on the Cotentin
Peninsula in Normandy, a long way from the action.
Montgomery pressed hard for a narrow penetration into Germany,
while Eisenhower held out for a broad front approach to the German
border. With the British rapid advance into Belgium and, perhaps
as a consolation for not having control of all land forces, Monty
was given the Allied Expeditionary Air Force -- all the parachute
troops and planes to carry them -- plus supplies for MARKET GARDEN,
the drive intended for the narrow penetration into Germany.
While the intent may have been good, terrain was against them.
Traditionally the British had kept their forces bordering the
sea and it was here that the rivers deepened, widened and the
land was low. What resulted was "a bridge too far"
and repulse and withdrawal at Arnhem, this between 17-26 September.
In addition, supplies still coming over the beaches in Normandy,
were going to Patton's 3rd Army and Devers 6th Army Group beyond
that.
VII Corps and the 3rd Armored Division were not at the front
of the line for supplies and replacements, even though the "Stolberg
Corridor" may have been the most favorable route to the
Rhine and encirclement of the Ruhr, once past the West Wall and
the pillboxes beyond Stolberg - Donnerberg (287) and Weissenberg
(283). It was a long time before this happened.
Lieutenant Colonel Lawrence G. Foster, commanding officer
of the 23rd Armored Engineer Battalion, was questioned afterwards
about the engineering aspects of breaching the dragon' s teeth
and the West Wall, to which he replied that from an engineering
standpoint it presented no problem. However, his engineers operating
bulldozer with a thin sheet of armor around the cab were confronted
with military, not engineering problems in putting dirt over
the dragon's teeth.
Up until 20 September there was attached to the 3rd Armored
the 991st Field Artillery Battalion, consisting of self-propelled
155mm guns, which were extremely useful in attacking pillboxes.
Their approach was to boresight through the barrel on the
gun and continue to fire armor piercing shells until the much
shaken occupants quit their shelter. Unfortunately, we did not
have them later for attacks on the Weissenberg (#283) and Donnerberg
(#287) hills, the dominant features just beyond Stolberg.
It had been a long haul from Normandy, and we were short on
tanks - one officer taking over a battalion with a T/0 of 54
tanks had seven in working condition - and woefully in need of
maintenance and supplies, to say nothing of replacements.
Too, we had to help the 1st Infantry Division and others in
the taking of Aachen, the first large city in Germany to fall
into Allied hands.
Stalemate in the Town of Stolberg
The period when the division was stalled around Stolberg and
before the November offensive was a welcome but frustrating one.
Fall weather set in with occasional rain and cooler temperatures.
We took to houses and all caught colds, having been inured to
sleeping outdoors. Division headquarters, in the Prym estate
house overlooking Stolberg, was in advance of combat command
and regimental headquarters. The Prym's had a manufacturing plant
in Stolberg, making fastenings for clothes, belt buckles and
the like. On one occasion we had a hush-hush visit from an RAF
type. It turned out that he was inspecting the Prym plant for
manufacturing blades for jet aircraft. When one of the German
experimental jets passed our area, the 486th ack-ack found their
guns could not track them.
Jets were not the only German weapons in the air, although
they were scarce. The V-1 flying bomb became more common, usually
passing over our heads headed for Liege about sundown. The division
command post mess line was shelled once and after the men were
treated, General Rose, who was outside, had the medics treat
a small wound.
In the long trek through France and Belgium and with increasing
casualties, members of the FFI and Armee Blanc and other foreign
nationals had been "enlisted," given a uniform and
the weapon of a fallen comrade and teamed up with a GI. As replacements
became available these were "discharged" and sent home.
Orders also came from on high that we were to cease wearing
captured or liberated foreign sidearms and take standard issue.
The water works for Stolberg fell on our side of the line,
and it fell the lot of our 23rd Engineers, with the help of a
resident German superintendent, to keep the water supply going.
In spite of shelling the line and a shortage of pipe and parts,
this was done. We supplied both sides of the line and hoped the
Germans appreciated it.
At one point the men of the 1st Infantry Division in partly-taken
Aachen filled a tram car with captured explosives, fixed a fuse
to it and sent the tram downhill to German positions. Not much
damage was done, but the explosion was highly thought of. Not
to be outdone, some of our men in Stolberg placed explosives
with a fuse lit on a raft flowing downstream on the Inde River
toward German positions, with a like result. Boys will be boys!
On 7 October the division, which had been on the secret list
for publication purposes even though the Germans knew where we
were and we knew where we were, was lifted and we began to get
credit in YANK and the Stars and Stripes.
During our early period in the Stolberg area, a few deserters
would come across the lines nearly every night to surrender,
often bearing "good conduct passes" delivered by artillery.
About then Secretary of the Treasury Morgenthau's scorched earth
policy for postwar Germany became known to the other side. Josef
Goebbels, the Nazi propaganda chief, got on the airways and said,
"I told you so," and the trickle dried up. So much
for politicians.
After the November offensive and a few days before our trip
to the Bulge, division headquarters officers had a party, the
only one during combat. Blouses were brought out and the wrinkles
attacked. A regimental dance band appeared, nurses and Red Cross
women from Liege were brought forward in two and one-half ton
trucks and a good time was had by all.
Were the nurses a little concerned or apprehensive about being
within rifle shot of the front? "No," they said, "not
actually, it was quite a relief to be away from the V-l bombs
falling on Liege."
There were visitors at Stolberg, too. General Eisenhower,
Admiral Richard Byrd, the latter en route to Russia as President
Roosevelt's envoy. And newspapermen.
Down in Stolberg proper things were not so jolly. Nightly
forays by troops of both sides occurred, sometimes with one party
in the attic, another in the cellar or in between. The late Conrad
Gurtner (1/36) recalled being positioned in the second story
of a house in Stolberg, facing a narrow lane with the Germans
across the way. A German soldier, who chewed tobacco would occasionally
spit out of the window -- phut!
Gurtner, finding this annoying, took a piece of telephone
wire, attached it to a grenade and, using an underhand throw,
sailed it across the opening into the window of the offending
soldier. BOOM! There was no more spitting.
Over to our left flank and in the VII Corps zone every infantry
division there, the 4th, 9th and 83rd Divisions, received a bloody
pounding with tree bursts and mortar and small arms fire. This
was the Huertgen Forest.
The Build-Up: Re-group & Re-supply
At the time VII Corps first made successful attacks on the
vaunted West Wall defenses, the 1st Army plan anticipated bypassing
and surrounding the city of Aachen, allowing it to fall when
it would after the main attack had passed. This decision was
later changed. Aachen would have to be taken. The plan for securing
the city was to cut off its easterly escape and supply routes,
draw a tight cordon about the town and then demand capitulation
of the German garrison. The 30th Infantry Division of XIX Corps,
north of the city, and the 1st Infantry Division of VII Corps,
to the south, made an effective closure of the gap east of Aachen
on 10 October and the surrender ultimatum was carried into the
city by an officer representative from the 1st Division.
When the ultimatum terms expired shortly before noon on 11
October, there had been no answer from the German commander.
Accordingly, the attack on the city begun. The IX Tactical Air
Force dropped tons of bombs on targets within Aachen, and supporting
artillery of VII Corps fired 169 tons of ammunition into the
city. Elements of the 26th Infantry Regiment started advancing
into the city from the northeast while other elements of the
1st Division beat off determined enemy attacks east of Aachen.
Within Aachen proper the mopping-up operations proceeded slowly
and systematically. American losses were at a minimum. An expert
job was being done.
On 18 October, Task Force Hogan was attached to the 1st Division.
This was the only element of 3rd Armored to participate in the
operation for Aachen. This task force operated in the western
part of town. They seized the strategic Lousberg Hill on 19 October
and, together with the 26th Infantry Regiment, took over 700
prisoners.
Colonel Wilke, commander of the Aachen garrison, surrendered
on 21 October. While this operation at Aachen was going on, the
3rd Armored and the 9th Infantry Divisions continued to improve
and hold defensive positions in their zones.
The 1st Army was proceeding with the regrouping and resupply
activities preparatory to continuing the offensive into Germany.
Twenty-four hours a day the roads in rear areas were crowded
with convoys bringing tons of supplies and thousands of fresh
troops to the front. The unprecedented rapidity of the drive
across France and Belgium had strained communication lines almost
to the elastic limit. But now the Allied Armies at the western
gate of Germany were daily gaining new strength at a rapidly
accelerating pace.
During this build-up period, the 3rd Armored held a barrow
zone from Stolberg to Mausbach except for the period 25 October
to 10 November. The zone then extended south through the Hurtgen
Forest to the V Corps boundary just east of Zweifall. Troops
holding the line were rotated within the division in order to
give all units the maximum time to rest and refit. New replacements
to the ranks could be brought up to a state of training impossible
in a moving situation. Abandoned houses provided shelter for
many of the troops and served as protected kitchens, mess halls,
and command posts.
Maintenance troops worked long hours to get the hundreds of
tanks and vehicles in the best possible condition. Now they had
the advantage of good places to work. Houses were occupied, and
the hard-standings at railway sidings and stations became workshops.
By 11 November, the regrouping of forces had been completed
in VII Corps. VII Corps was ready to resume the offensive.
A German View of the 3rd Armored Divison
The following information was extracted from an account of
Lieutenant Hans Zeplien, commander of the 14th (Tank Destroyer)
Company of the 89lh Grenadier (Infantry) Regiment of the 12th
Volksgrenadier (Infantry) Division, which entrained in the West
Prussia area on 15 September and detrained, in a hurry, at Duren
in the early morning of the 17th.
The German View from Lt. Zeplien:
As soon as our "travelling group" had left the train,
they were moved to the Eschweiler-Weisweiler area in dispersed
formation. Luck was with them, there were no American air attacks.
They, inclusive of 14th Tank Destroyers, arrived at Eschweiler
around noon, and were immediately assigned to their defense area
at the southern outskirts of the town. The Americans were known
to be advancing towards Eschweiler from the south with strong
infantry and tank forces, after having penetrated the Westwall
(Siegfried Line) between Zweifall and Schevenhiitte.
I was unable to form a clear picture of the situation, because
the company was lacking even a map of the Eschweiler area. Normally,
a company had 8-10 maps, which was quite in compliance with what
was required. Even in the further course of action no maps were
provided to the company - obviously a question of organization.
The 1st RPzB (Bazooka) Platoon of 14th (Tank Destroyers) Company
89 was assigned to the 1st Battalion of GR 89 and set on immediate
move to join that unit. The 1st Battalion was in the Bergrath-Volkenrath
area, and preparing there for an attack against the Americans
who, with weak forces, had advanced into the immediate vicinity
of Werth.
At the southern outskirts of Eschweiler no battle noise, such
as artillery fire or detonations of bombs, was audible. The 2nd
RPzB (Bazooka) Platoon was to be assigned to the 2nd Battalion
of GR 89, but no one was able to tell me where I could find them,
and what their mission was. According to the aforementioned narrative
of Company Sergeant Eickhoff, the 2nd Battalion had, after a
forced march, reached an area very close to the village of Schevenhutte.
Here they were supposed to set up a main fighting line (HKL),
although prerequisites had ceased to exist.
Besides, the enemy situation was unclear. After the 2nd Battalion
had set out for an attack, the Americans just waited for them
to "mass up," and attacked them from three sides with
infantry, artillery, and tanks. The outcome were heavy casualties.
Many soldiers of the 5th - 8th Companies had to be reported missing,
and had probably fallen into American captivity. Luckily, dusk
prevented the worst. As a result, the 2nd RPzB (Bazookas) Platoon
had to be converted into the Anti-Tank Reserve of GR 89, and
was along with the company staff, sent to positions south of
the "RESERVE" coal mine at Bergrath, a little northeast
of the railway line, in a gardening area from where advancing
American tanks could be attacked by foxholed bazooka teams firing
through the hedges there. Local civilians provided me with the
required information in respect of the area.
The 3rd (AT) Platoon (Type 37 Trench Guns) went into positions
at the southern outskirts of Eschweiler, from where they were
able to combat, out of a flank line, tanks attacking beyond the
village of Bergrath.
In the late afternoon of 17 September 1944, the 1st Battalion,
advancing via Volkenrath and Hastenrath-Scherpenseel, attacked
and took the village of Werth lying on top of a hill area; only
weak resistance was encountered there. At that time, only a few
civilians had left the villages, and their cattle were either
on the pasture grounds or kept inside the cow-houses. Local women
and, in particular, the village boys, were of great help to us,
and during the fighting that followed later they rescued many
wounded and provided first aid. In the course of the afternoon,
the 2nd RPzB (Bazookas) Platoon was, as the regiment's Anti-Tank
Reserve, moved to Hastenrath. The soldiers took position in AT
foxholes on either side of Hastenrath and Scherpenseel along
the eastern outskirts of the villages, in order to stop at these
outskirts a tank attack of the Americans which had advanced beyond
the positions of the 1st Battalion.
The 3rd Platoon -- AT with Type 37 Trench Guns -- was brought
to the southern outskirts of Volkenrath to cover the area from
either side of the road leading from Hastenrath to Volkenrath,
and from the southeastern outskirts of Volkenrath. American artillery
occasionally fired into the Hastenrath-Scherpenseel area, but
seldom at Bergrath and Nothberg.
In the course of the early morning hours of 18 September 1944
only the 1st Battalion GR 89 assembled in the Werth area for
an attack, as the 2nd Battalion was still employed in the Schevenhiitte
area on 18 September.
The situation was such that within the sector of attack assigned
to GR 89 American tank forces had occupied the villages of Mausbach
and Diepenlinchen along with infantry forces, and that their
infantry were holding the Weissenberg cluster of buildings.
GR 89's mission was to take and hold the Weissenberg cluster
along with the hillside and Diepenlinchen, and, in the later
course of the attack, Mausbach as well. A counter-attack of the
Americans was to be expected any time.
During the early morning hours of 18 September, American harassing
fire went as far as Volkenrath. In particular, shells went down
near the crossroads Volkenrath-Hastenrath-Werth and the village
exits. The weather on that day was rather misty, and this was
the reason why the attack was delayed.
Although the 1st Battalion had to carry on its attack against
enemy forces much superior in strength, no assault guns to accompany
the infantry, no tanks, and not even the 7.5 cm AT guns of the
12th Tank Destroyer Battalion, were available to support the
action, although intelligence was at hand that the battalion
had to encounter an armored division. I think that even our artillery
had supported the attack with but minor forces. All that was
available to the battalion for anti-tank action was the 2nd RPzB
(Bazooka) Platoon. In other words, it was armed with 2 x 18 RPzB
(Bazookas) as armor-piercing equipment, plus about 60 Panzerfausts
within the combat companies. If one considers that tanks of the
Sherman type are capable of firing from a distance of 1,200 meters
and using their machine guns at down from 500 meters, it is easy
to fancy what an attacking infantry unit with its armor-piercing
equipment (Bazookas and Panzerfausts) can do against them with
firing ranges of 300 meters and 40 meters respectively. For that
reason alone the attack of the 1st Battalion was bound to either
fail or cost excessive losses to reach the target.
Nevertheless, the attack of the 1st Battalion started well.
It was a surprise to the Americans, and before they were able
to organize their defense, the 1st Company had taken the cluster
of buildings, and the 2nd Company the slag-pile area of Weissenberg,
and taken numerous prisoners. Besides, the 2nd Company was supposed
to cover the open flank of the battalion on its right side, and
had, therefore, to attack in a deeply echeloned formation. The
1st RPzB (Bazooka) Platoon followed the attacking 1st Battalion
along the west side, and the 2nd RPzB (Bazooka) Platoon along
the east side of the road from Werth to Diepenlinchen. The individual
bazooka groups advanced in the rear of the attacking combat companies
from cover to cover and at a distance preventing their elimination
by the American infantry fire directed at the combat companies.
All bazooka gunners knew that their bazookas, on account of
their low firing range of maximum 150 meters against moving,
and 300 meters against standing tanks, were no assault -- but
rather defense weapons. It was important, therefore, to move
ahead from cover to cover, and trying to knock down, from a well
concealed position, an attacking enemy tank approaching the said
firing range. This, of course, was difficult in an open area
such as that between Werth and Diepenlinchen, which, besides
the clusters of buildings and some slag piles, provided no natural
cover. Not only so: The American tanks north of Diepenlinchen
did not approach the firing range, but rather kept at a distance
after the Americans had, sufficiently early, been able to identify
the two bazooka platoons as rocket carriers. The soldiers thus
did not shoulder their weapons, but rather carried them like
handbags with the bazookas dangling from long straps a few inches
above the ground. And yet, they received particularly violent
artillery fire. Once they got close to the rear groups of the
advancing infantry, they would be shouted at: "Get off and
away - you're dragging artillery fire on us!"
As soon as the Americans had realized that they were being
attacked by forces of battalion size, they opened concentrated
artillery fire. It seemed to me that several batteries were using
shrapnel shells when firing into the battalion's sector. These
shells are designed in a way that they explode 10 to 14 meters
above the ground, then releasing a hail of lead-shots on the
attackers. Their use is banned under the Hague Convention, as
is the use of explosive rifle bullets -- the latter practiced
by the Soviet and the British forces. Due to that shrapnel shelling,
losses in that rather open area were extremely high. From the
time of taking Weissenberg, the American artillery fire increased,
and tanks on their move towards Diepenlinchen took up intervention
in combat from distances which were well beyond bazooka reach.
About one hour following the attack, I, along with the company
headquarters unit and Major Lemcke, the commander of GR 89, proceeded
from Werth towards Weissenberg. When arriving at an area called
"Am obersten Busch" and south of that area, we and
other soldiers following the attack received shrapnel fire of
such intensity that we had to take shelter in a near-by quarry.
Flattening in that open area, as I did when firing started, provided
no protection at all, but rather enlarged the size of the target.
It is, indeed, a hopeless situation being exposed to volleys
of 15 cm shells roaring up and exploding overhead in a fire-ball.
I had not expected to escape unharmed when the lead-balls hit
the grassland around me. In spite of that dreadful defense fire,
the 1st Battalion managed to take the foremost streets of Diepenlinchen
on its first onset, but had to take cover here.
Immediately after 1st/ 89 and elements of 2nd/89 (Lieutenant
Rix as the company commander, along with the Company Headquarter
unit and 2nd Platoon of 2nd/89) had arrived at Diepenlinchen,
the Americans launched their attack with tanks and accompanying
infantry out of the village of Mausbach. Due to that American
counterattack, those elements of the 1st Battalion at Diepenlinchen
and Weissenberg were forced to become defensive. After having
fired their last Panzerfausts, the 1st Platoon of 2nd/89 and
the Company Headquarter unit were taken prisoner by the counter-attacking
Americans. Part of lst/89 had to share the same fate. Going over
into defense in that largely uncovered area resulted in further
losses of the 1st Battalion. As an example I quote the losses
suffered by the 2nd RPzB-Platoon (Bazooka) on that day while
fighting east of the road: two killed, six wounded, seven missing.
Statements made by comrades suggest that seven men missing were
probably killed, too. At the same time a number of bazookas became
damaged, and the platoon did not succeed in knocking down any
American tank. That is to say, no knock-down was reported, which,
on the other hand, does not necessarily mean that actually no
tanks were destroyed. After all, the dead and missing were unable
to report knock-downs. One man of 1st RPzB (Bazooka) Platoon
was killed.
On 19 September 1944, the Americans continued their tank and
infantry based counter attack against Deipenlinchen, partly directed
towards the open flank of the 1st Battalion. In the course of
that counter attack they reinforced both their attacking units
and their artillery fire. The 1st Battalion, now weakened by
action that had taken place on the previous day, had to evacuate
the foremost streets of Diepenlinchen, and withdraw to the Weissenberg
slag piles, leaving behind about 30 wounded, including Captain
Gronboldt, the commander of the battalion. The 30 wounded had
to wait until night of 20 September until they could be taken
out of the tunnel at Diepenlinchen by the regiment's engineering
platoon who transported them into safety to the village of Werth.
In the course of 19 September 1944, the cluster of buildings
at Weissenberg changed hands several times. Further high losses
were inflicted on GR 89 on 19 September.
The 14th Company (Tank Destroyers), to quote another example,
had to register five wounded near Werth (3rd Platoon) and 11
near Diepenlinchen (seven of 1st Platoon, four of 2nd Platoon),
and 14 men missing (five of 1st Platoon, nine of 2nd Platoon)
in the area of Diepenlinchen, Weissenberg and Hochweger Hof.
Personnel set out of action during those two days amounted to
16 men out of 48 of the 1st RPzB Platoon (bazookas), 31 out of
48 of the 2nd RPzB Platoon, and four out of the 3rd AT Platoon.
(Type 37, caliber 7.5cm trench guns).
Losses in terms of personnel and equipment were high on the American
side as well (although losses of equipment were not so much a
matter of concern to them), as could be realized by the marked
slackening of their pressure in the course of 19 September. On
that day, F.W. (Sergeant) Danzinger of 3rd/89 knocked down three
American tanks with panzerfausts.
On 20 September 1944, GR 89, on account of heavy losses in
terms of personnel and equipment, made defensive arrangements
along the line of depression south of the Romerfeld (adjacent
to the GR 48 sector) and Hitzberg area near Oberster Busch -
the sports ground south of Werth - Hill 283, north of Weissenberg
- Hochweger Hof - Duffenter. On 20 September the Americans continued
their attacks against the positions of GR 89 (shallow shelter
holes) with tanks and infantry, with the main thrust near Weissenberg.
Here they lost one of their tanks of the Sherman type which was
knocked down by 0. Gren. (Pfc) Kropp of 1st RPzB Platoon with
a bazooka. Kropp was slightly wounded during this action. That
American attack was finally repelled near Hill 283 north of Weissenburg,
and, probably due to high causalities on the previous days, not
taken up again.
In the course of 19 September, it could have been 20 September
as well, the 2nd Battalion, so far involved in defensive fighting
near Schevenhiitte, arrived at the GR 89 and became employed
in the Hochweger Hof, Duffenter sector. The afternoon and evening
of 20 September was comparatively quiet in the Werth area, and
the soldiers of GR 89 used the evening and night hours to deepen
their shelter positions, provide them, as far as feasible, with
shallow connecting trenches, recondition their arms, and replace
their ammunition. Casualty and ammo expenditure reports had to
be submitted daily by 07.00 and 17.00 hours. Unfortunately, ground
water soon filled the deepened shelter holes, especially in the
Hill 283 area whose soil rather resembled that of a raised bog.
The deepened portions of the connecting trenches, too, drew water,
so that the soldiers of the combat company were forced to lie
down near the escapes rather than inside their trenches. In case
of American artillery bursts they had no other choice than to
take cover "under water."
The Americans as the attackers were in a far better position.
Any of their fire-actions in the area were performed from armored
vehicles. Their infantry just moved from cover to cover, and
had no ground water problems. And yet, their attempt to take
the village of Werth, their target, remained unsuccessful. Towards
the evening of 20 September they set out with an armored group
against the farm buildings of Hochweger Hof, and took the farm
against the violent resistance of 6th Company/89 of the 2nd Battalion.
On 21 September 1944, if I remember rightly, Uffz. (Unteroffizier
- Corporal) Neubert of 6th Company reported to 2nd Battalion:
"Escaped from Hochweger Hof by dawn. Noticed their five
halftracks, one heavy MG, and five tanks of the Sherman type.
One group of engineers out of 12th Pioneer Battalion (Engineer
Battalion) on a mine-laying mission was encountered by that armored
combat group, and may have been killed. At the time of my escape,
20 of our soldiers were still at Hochweger Hof: one radio operator,
one Wachtmeister (sergeant), severely wounded, five members of
the air force, six members of 6th Company/89 and seven men from
other units. Besides the sergeant, the following people were
wounded: one air force private, one air force corporal, and four
soldiers of GR 89. There was one German caterpillar tractor (RSO)
left in the farmyard."
On 21 September the "frontline" in the Werth-Duffenter
sector was quiet, apart from the usual artillery fire, after
the Americans had discontinued all their attacks. As regards
the substantial American losses occurred within the sector of
OR 89, the number of American tanks destroyed were the only precise
figures that could be ascertained.
[END of German View from Lt. Zeplien]
We of the 3rd Armored were familiar, by this time, with the
Panzerfaust, a hand held anti-tank weapon, very effective at
short range, but Zeplein' s company had a platoon equipped with
88mm bazookas effective at 300 yards against stationary targets
and 150 yards against a moving one. These "stovepipes"
made our smaller bazookas look like toys.
He found our TOT (time over target) artillery fire particularly
effective, but it was not in contravention of the Hague convention.
Also, he ascribed the effectiveness of his men to "Timers"
from the Russian front.
Exception is taken to Zeplien's contention that U.S. artillery
air burst shells contravened the Hague convention. What about
the German "Bouncing Betty" mines which sprayed a circle
of balls just below waist high when stepped on?
Allied Winter Objective: The Roer River
This attack was nothing puny, as related in the 104th Division's
wartime history, Timberwolf Tracks.
"The biggest Allied attack since the St. Lo breakthrough
was to commence," it said of the 16 November attack. "At
1105 you heard the distant continuous thunder like Niagara Falls,
very far away. It was the heavy bombers of the 8th Air Force
and the Royal Air Force arriving on schedule from England; simultaneously
more than 1,000 cannon began to punctuate the monotonous drone
of the bombers. For the next 90 minutes, 2,400 medium and heavy
bombers passed over the front line to bomb the strategic targets
of Eschweiler, Duren and Julich. Tanks, tank destroyers, mortars
and infantry cannon took up the incessant roar."
In this, to the south side, the 3rd Armored had a limited
but important role. According to Charles B. MacDonald's, The
Siegfried Line Campaign, VII Corps was to launch a main effort
towards Schevenhuette, the farthest point of penetration yet
made by Allied troops into Germany, from which the 1st Infantry
was to attack northeast towards Hamich and another hill, #232,
with the 3rd Armored on a narrow front between the 1st and the
104th to the north.
Over on our left flank, in the zone of the 104th Division
now, was the Donnerberg Hill, #287, not to be taken until 18
November by the 414th Infantry, 104th Division.
Final goal of all this massive effort by Allied forces was
the Roer River, with two upstream dams still under control of
German forces, even though strenuous efforts had been made to
capture or render them useless, including use of British torpedo
planes normally used in sea warfare. They did not succeed, either.
During our stay at Stolberg, the air corps had been regularly
taking photos of ground positions beyond the Roer. Initially
single foxholes were dug, to be followed by connecting one foxhole
to another, these later to be joined. Captain Felix DeLeo and
his Photographic Interpretation Team #38 had faithfully kept
track of these fortifications, which were issued to troops to
battalion level via G-2 periodic reports. Alas these fortifications
were not to be overrun at this time.
This attack also marked the use of a new weapon, electrically
detonated multiple rocks in the nature of the German Nebelwerfer
and the Russian Katuschka. It made quite a fireworks display
and the multiple barrels, one above the other, were mounted on
a two-wheeled caisson.
In the middle of this attack, the Germans brought in a reserve
division, the 47th Infantry, to our front. MacDonald relates
that early in the morning of D-Day a prisoner revealed the enemy'
s plan for relieving the 12th Division that day. This information
was obtained by 3rd Armored prisoner of war interrogators, and
the information quickly rushed to VII Corps by Lieutenant Colonel
Andrew Barr, 3rd Armored G-2, for which he later received the
Legion of Merit.
3AD's Role in Winter Offensive
To meet the expected Allied offensive, the German Army utilized
the time and forces available to them to the best advantage possible.
Between Allied lines and the Rhine River there was much strong
defensive terrain. On this terrain, they strengthened the natural
barriers with strong field fortifications. The first such natural
barrier to the VII Corps was the Roer River. Between the front
lines and the river, the enemy was well dug-in. The villages
and towns were organized as strong points. Minefields were laid
all along the front and well covered with defensive fires.
For the coming offensive, the objective of the 3rd Armored
was the ridge just northeast of the road connecting Hamich and
Hastenrath. The mission was to attack and seize this ground and
secure it until relieved by elements of the 1st Division, mopping
up all resistance in the sector. The pan of the line just east
of Stolberg was to be held until passed through by elements of
the 104th Division. When the division objective was secured,
the 3rd Armored was to be prepared to exploit any breakthrough
in the sector of either the 1st or 4th Divisions by attacking
east toward Cologne.
Combat Command A was given the missions of holding the Stolberg
line and supporting the attack.
Combat Command B was to seize the division objective. The
units of Combat Command B fought as reinforced battalions. The
elements that composed Combat Command B were 1st Battalion, 33rd
Armored (Reinf) commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Mills, 2nd Battalion,
33rd Armored Regiment commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Lovelady,
Combat Command Reserve commanded by Major Tousey, and the 391st
Artillery Groupment commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Garton.
Two tank platoons accompanied Combat Command Headquarters.
The zone of the 1st Battalion was on the left. Their objectives
were Hastenrath and Scherpenseel. The 2nd Battalion was to advance
in the right of the division zone up to the little village of
Kottenichjust north and west of Hamich. Leaving a holding force
here, they were to move from the northwest on to the objective
west of Hamich.
On 16 November, there was a break in the weather. On the VII
Corps front, aircraft of the 8th Air Force hit targets in the
Eschweiler-Langerwehe area while bombers of the 9th Air Force
struck targets further to the east during the afternoon. Fighter
bombers of the IX Tactical Air Force hit prearranged targets
close to the front of the 1st and 4th Infantry Divisions. Bad
weather hampered close support mission on call, but some were
flown.
The attack was launched at 1300 and advanced rapidly on the
right. Part of the force went directly into Werth while another
part proceeded further north, took Kottenich, and then advanced
on Werth from the northeast. A small infantry force was left
to secure Kottenich.
Advances were made toward Hastenrath and Scherpenseel. Soon
after crossing the line of departure the left column was stopped
by a minefield. The column was moved through Lovelady's zone
to continue the attack on Hastenrath.
On the left, the line remained virtually the same in the vicinity
of Stolberg. On 17 November, mopping-up was being conducted in
the division zone. Cleaning up Hastenrath was a slow job. The
town was subjected to almost continual fire from enemy artillery
and mortars.
Hastenrath was a tough nut. Lieutenant Henry Earl took his
little force into the town, wrecking havoc until, unsupported
by infantry, his tank was hit and he captured. Lieutenant Colonel
Mills on 18 November, outside his tank and "buttoning up"
his position, was killed by friendly fire. Henry Earl had been
in the tank behind Captain Redmond in Normandy as recounted in
First Combat, wounded at St. Pois, returned to duty and now --
captured.
By 21 November, the 104th Division and the 1st Division advances
pinched out the 3rd Armored Division sector. Combat Command A
was regrouping in the vicinity of Busbach. Combat Command B had
moved its command post to Mausbach. Its units were regrouped
in the area they had taken.
Resistance had been stubborn. The Germans were selling every
foot of ground at a high price.
Elements of the 1st Division reported some of the hardest
fighting they had experienced in any of the operations to date.
On 24 November, the division commander gave verbal instructions
to the commanding general of Combat Command A to organize a task
force to attack from positions east of Eschweiler and secure
the high ground between Langerwehe and Frenz. The enemy holding
this ground had slowed the advance of a long section of the Corps
front.
Attacking northeast between two railroads, this task force
commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Richardson met with very strong
opposition. By night they had seized and secured Huchein and
prepared to continue to advance the next morning.
Richardson's task force was in a position to launch a coordinating
attack on the objective. The tanks had been stopped by mud in
the left sector and by heavy anti-tank fire from the vicinity
of Langerwehe on the right. The infantry made the assault supported
by direct fire from tanks and close support aircraft. The objective
was taken. The infantry organized the position, and the remainder
of the task force rejoined Combat Command A in the vicinity of
Busbach on 27 November.
During the period 16 to 27 November, the 3rd Armored Division
captured 626 prisoners.
From 27 November to 9 December, the 3rd Armored was not in
contact. The VII Corps attack moved slowly toward the Roer River.
In an effort to loosen the stubborn enemy defense in the VII
Corps zone where the situation seemed to be developing into a
stalemate, the Corps launched a coordinated attack on 10 December.
Combat Command R of the 3rd Armored was committed to this
attack in the zone of the 9th Infantry Division with the mission
of attacking the vicinity of Langerwehe through Obergeich and
Geich, and moving rapidly forward to seize and secure Echtz.
Task Force Hogan of Combat Command B made the attack while
Task Force Kane of the same combat command supported the assault
by fire from the high ground in the vicinity of Stutgerhof. A
minefield at the western edge of Obergeich stopped the tanks.
Then, while the town was smothered with tanks, artillery, and
mortar fire from the northwest and south, the two infantry companies
of the task force advanced. By 1700, Obergeich was secured. When
the attack continued toward Geich equally strong resistance was
again met. Elements reached the edge of Geich, but at dark the
advance stopped, and the entire task force took up positions
between Geich and Obergeich.
Task Force Kane, displaced from their supporting positions,
advanced across the muddy terrain toward Echtz. They met little
resistance until they approached Echtz, where enemy mortar and
small arms fire opposed them. By 2100, this resistance was overcome
and the town secured.
The next morning Task Force Hogan continued the attack toward
Geich, and after heavy fighting secured the town. Sufficient
force was left in Geich to hold road blocks, and the task force
moved out to continue the attack east toward Hoven. Kane had
started this attack on Hoven at first light and had made good
progress initially. However, the enemy concentrated artillery
fire in this sector and stopped the attack. When Kane and Hogan
launched a coordinated attack in the afternoon the same enemy
guns plus three enemy tanks again stopped the attack cold, and
enemy artillery caused heavy casualties to the infantry. That
night 1st Battalion, 60th Infantry Regiment, 9th Division was
attached to Combat Command R to be used in continuing the attack
on Hoven.
Kane's Task Force was reconstituted, and the attack on Hoven
was continued, but at 1630 the town was secured. A system of
protective road blocks was established around town. At midnight
the 1st Battalion, 60th Infantry assumed responsibility for the
security of Hoven, and Combat Command R moved on 13 December
to assembly areas near Mausbach.
So ended a phase. By 16 December the VII Corps front ran generally
along the Roer River. The enemy would make the next move.
Next Chapter: Battle of the Bulge
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