The Bulge - The Civilian Costs
Bill Mauldin did a cartoon portraying some British Tommies
surveying an after-action area taken by GIs and one of them remarking
to a dough, "You Yanks leave a messy battlefield."
The area was strewn with weapons and equipment, not all ours.
This was bound to be the case in the Bulge when the snows
melted and revealed the knocked out German and American tanks
to show where the battle occurred. There is one Panther tank
on the road between Manhay and Hotton which, when passed in 1976,
caused the hair on the back of the writer's neck to stand up
when faced with a long barrel 75mm.
We were not the only ones to sustain damage and death. When
Liege was liberated at the end of the first week in September
of 1944, there was relatively little damage done, apart from
some broken glass. When we had been in Stolberg for awhile, there
was a daily ritual about sundown of Buzz Bombs - V-l's - passing
overhead. Most of these were headed for Liege.
Both before and during the Bulge, the people of Liege and
the surrounding area sustained many casualties, including those
massacred at Parfondruy. Here are some figures reported by Henri
Register, a member of the WWII historical society, Center of
Research and Information on the Battle of the Ardennes, at Liege:
- Killed: 3,336
- Seriously wounded: 5,354
- Houses destroyed in area of Liege: 7,305
- V-1 and V-2 rockets received: 1,592 total, killing 1,649
and wounding 2,558.
A more detailed breakdown on houses affected shows 2,809 destroyed,
20,588 uninhabitable and more than 72,000 damaged.
"We had our burden to take," Register says, "but,
once again, the Americans were always very helpful with first
aid, ambulances whatever they could, supporting thus our civil
services."
3AD's Numerous Separate Actions
The German counteroffensive in the Ardennes started on 16
December, and on 18 December elements of the 3rd Armored Division
were on their way to meet the attacking German columns as they
raced westward.
Combat Command A was the first of the Spearhead's elements
to move south out of the Aachen area. It was detached from the
division and attached to V Corps. They cleared the area near
Busbach at 1200 and moved into new assembly area near Eupen as
mobile reserve. They remained attached to V Corps until 21 December
when they were reattached to the 3rd Armored and started moving
to the division's sector near Grandmenil. During this period,
General Hickey's force was charged with the defense of Eupen.
There was one combat job to be done; this was handled by part
of the combat command's infantry. A few German paratroopers,
part of the force whose mission was to cut the Eupen-Malmedy
road, were in the woods along the west side of the road just
south of Eupen. The infantry quickly liquidated this force, taking
a few prisoners and a considerable amount of ammunition and light
weapons, principally machine guns and mortars, which had been
dropped to the surrounded paratroopers.
Combat Command B was detached from the 3rd Armored on 19 December
and attached to V Corps, initially with the mission of protecting
Verviers. When they arrived in the assembly areas, they were
attached to the XVIII Corps (Airborne) and committed to action
in the la Gleize-Stavelot sector on 20 December.
Task Force Lovelady was attached to the 30th Infantry Division
on 20 December, and was given another infantry company (E Company,
120th Infantry Regiment). The job assigned this task force was
to move south from Pont de Lorrain which had been reached without
making contact, and establish a road block on the la Gleize-Stavelot
road east of la Gleize at the main road junction and to assist
in the capture of Stavelot, where the 30th Division was already
fighting.
As the task force moved south, they met an enemy convoy of
several ammunition trucks, two 150mm towed guns and a towed 75mm
field piece at the junction of their route with la Gleize -Stavelot
highway. This convoy was destroyed and a block established as
ordered. The task force then continued south and reached a road
junction near Troi Ponts, where they intended to turn east toward
Malmedy. Here they met enemy anti-tank fire and lost the four
leading tanks of the column. Since the enemy seemed to be concentrated
in some strength between this point and Malmedy, Lovelady set
up another road block and left Major Stallings in charge of this
critical position. For support, another block was set up further
to the north of Grand Coo. These three road blocks employed all
of the infantry of the task force except the attached E Company.
When the situation had developed to this stage, Lovelady was
ordered to move east from Petit Coo, across the high ground,
to Parfondroy and cut off the road south of Parfondroy at its
junction with la Gleize-Stavelot highway. On the morning of 20
December, Task Force Lovelady moved out in the attack toward
Parfondroy following the secondary road across the hill from
Petit Coo. A heavy ground fog covered this movement, and the
town was reached without incident. It was here that Colonel Lovelady's
forces found evidence of German atrocities against civilians.
They discovered the bodies of several murdered women, children,
and old people in some of the buildings.
On 21 December, the task force held its positions while the
Ster-Parfondroy area was consolidated. Patrols from Stalling's
road block found that the enemy occupied the high ground to his
northeast. When Lovelady was ordered on the next day to take
this hill, he found that he could not use the road on which he
had entered Parfondroy since it was cut by the enemy. To further
complicate the situation the enemy had attacked from the woods
of Petite Coo, overrun the battalion aid station and cut the
road leading south to Stalling's force.
On 23 December Lovelady had got his forces back to Grand Coo
in position to attack south, clear the enemy from the high ground
and open the road to Stallings. The attack started that day but
only reached Petit Coo. Then another infantry company was attached
to the task force from the 30th Division, and on 24 December,
the enemy position was overcome. Late that afternoon the task
force was relieved in position and reverted to control of Combat
Command B assembled near Spa.
Meanwhile, the other task force of Combat Command B, Task
Force McGeorge, was fighting just to the west. On the morning
of 20 December, Task Force McGeorge attacked south from la Reid
in two columns. McGeorge on the east and Jordan on the west.
General Boudinot had assigned these columns the joint mission
of passing through elements of the 30th Division at Cour and
Chefna and clearing the road from Stoumont to la Gleize. The
fighting strength of each column consisted of a company of tanks
and a company of armored infantry (reinforced).
Jordan's column on 20 December met no opposition until they
were just north of Stoumont where enemy tanks and anti-tank guns
stopped their advance. Little progress was made until 22 December
when a coordinated attack took both Stoumont and the adjoining
town of Rouat.
McGeorge was having trouble getting into la Gleize. He was
stopped by tanks and anti-tank fire on his main route and on
all routes trying to bypass the opposition.
On 24 December Jordan's force had reached the western edge
of la Gleize, having continued their attack east from Stoumont.
McGeorge continued his attack north and east.
Jordon's troops forced the town, capturing or destroying 26
enemy tanks, four self-propelled guns and taking 150 prisoners.
On 25 December, Task Force McGeorge assembled with the remainder
of Combat Command B near Spa.
Back in the Stolberg area, the 3rd Armored Division, without
about two-thirds of its combat strength, was attached to XVIII
Airborne Corps on 19 December and was ordered to move to the
vicinity of Hotton-Ie Grand Pre.
On 20 December all elements had closed in this area after
an all night march through Stolberg, Aachen, Verviers, Aywaille,
Barvaux, Hotton.
After arriving, orders were issued to attack south and southeast
from the vicinity of Hotton-Ie Grand Pre, destroy all enemy in
the zone and secure the road from Manhay to Houffalize. The attack
was made by the 83rd Armored Reconnaissance (reinforced) in three
columns. The left column led by Lieutenant Colonel Kane followed
the Manhay-Houffalize road. The right column led by Lieutenant
Colonel Orr went through Erezee, Amonines, Dochamps, Samree,
etc.
The attack was launched on 20 December and advanced against
no resistance. As the center column approached Samree, they met
heavy artillery and encountered resistance of infantry supported
tanks. But they succeeded in getting a patrol north of Samre
and down to the objective line. This patrol set up a block on
the la Roche-Vielsalm road. The vicinity of this road junction
was the scene of much hard fighting that followed for the next
month. The right column reached a point near the Ourthe River
south of Samre, where it was ordered to remain for the night.
The left column reached the Manhay-Houffalize readjust west of
Malempre and was ordered to establish contact with the 82nd Airborne
Division at Herbronval. Division Reserve following the center
task force sent the 1st Battalion of the 36th Armored Infantry
Regiment, less one company, to reinforce Orr and stabilize the
situation at Samree.
The 83rd Armored Field Artillery Battalion was attached to
3rd Armored Division on 20 December.
The attack to the southeast by the Spearhead's relatively
light force continued well. This move was to screen the assembly
and deployment of VII Corps.
On 21 December, Combat Command A was reattached to the 3rd
Armored and started to move into assembly areas near Grandmeil.
the additional force was most welcome since the enemy was applying
heavy pressure throughout the division zone. Late on the afternoon
of 20 December the division command post moved to Erezee leaving
its signal company, headquarters company, except necessary personnel,
and E Company, 23rd Armored Engineer Battalion in Hotton to follow
the next day. During the night, an enemy force of infantry, tanks,
and mortars occupied the high ground between Soy and overlooking
Hotton. On 21 December, this force fired a brief mortar preparation
on Hotton and started to move into town with four tanks followed
by a few foot troops, the enemy tanks got into town and destroyed
several trucks and light vehicles, but two were knocked out and
a third was abandoned. By noon the town was quiet.
Combat Command R was ordered to move via Soy to Hotton to
repulse enemy action there but was unable to get through a German
road block just west of Soy. A light force of tanks and infantry
succeeded in reaching Hotton bypassing the Soy roadblock to the
north. A defense was set up in Hotton and, except for a few patrols,
there was no further action at Hotton that night.
The main force of Combat Command R remained engaged at the
Soy roadblock for the rest of the period.
Task Force Hogan moved out on 20 December to seize the crossings
of the Ourthe between
Goufy and Houffalize and to contact friendly elements on his
right. He met strong enemy elements of armor and infantry supported
by artillery and mortar fire. Due to the danger of being surrounded,
Hogan was ordered to withdraw north to Beffe.
Over on the left, Kane had made the contact with the 82nd
Airborne at Hebronval, and beat off a determined attack by tanks
and infantry at this road block.
Orr, in the center, continued his attack on Samree against
increased enemy pressure. Enemy tanks and infantry with supporting
weapons countered in force, and Orr was forced to withdraw north.
The 3rd Armored was further reinforced by the attachment of
the 1st Battalion of the 517 Parachute Infantry Regiment on 22
December, also the 643rd Tank Destroyer Battalion (Towed).
Very early in the morning of 22 December, Combat Command A
closed into assembly areas astride Manhay Werbemont road. Task
Force Doan was ordered to move to the main highway junction north
of Marche; cut the Marche-Bastogne road and gain the line Saint
Hubert la Roche and establish road blocks at intersections in
his area. Doan cut this road east of Hargimont. Combat Command
A furnished elements to reinforce Combat Command R in the Soy
area.
In Beffe, Hogan was receiving strong attacks from both the
north and southeast. He was very short of gasoline, and cut off
from supplies. After beating off determined attacks all day,
Hogan fought his way to Marcouray, which was on high ground.
He secured the town and set up all-around defense. Arrangements
were made to air-drop supplies to him the next day.
Kane continued to defend his road blocks south of Manhay and
pressed his attack on Dochamps were defended strongly. He was
stopped 1000 yards north of town.
Task Force Orr received reinforcements, repelled a strong
counterattack, and secured Amonines.
In Hotton, elements of Combat Command R received an infantry
attack. Some penetration was made, but the town was held.
On 23 December several changes in troop lists were made. The
3rd Armored reverted to VII Corps control. Task Force Doan was
attached to the 84th Infantry Division.
Combat Command R continued with its mission of clearing Soy-Hotton
road. It met heavy resistance on all sides of the town, and at
the end of the period had not passed the eastern edge of town.
Kane continued to attack Dochamps, but enemy resistance stiffened.
The defending force was equal to his own, and the attack failed.
Task Force Hogan remained surrounded in Marcouray. C-47s attempted
to drop supplies to him but missed.
Task Doan's blocks received heavy pressure throughout the
day, but they all held firmly.
Task Force Orr continued to attack southwest. He was engaged
throughout the period and succeeded in securing the town of Amonines.
On 24 December the north flank of the German salient was stabilized
along most of the line. However, the best intelligence information
indicated that the enemy was regrouping and massing preparatory
to continuing the attack to the north with at least part of the
main effort directed at the 3rd Armored Division sector. Accordingly,
the commanding general, VII Corps ordered the establishment of
a strong defensive line tying in firmly with the 7th Armored
Division (XVIII Corps) near Grandmenil on the east and with the
84th Infantry Division in the vicinity of Melreux on the west
flank.
To establish this line, it was necessary to attack south in
the Combat Command R sector and withdraw on the left, narrowing
the sector from Manhay to Grandmenil. Combat Command A now controlled
the entire left sector, and Combat Command R, the right.
Task Force Hogan remained cut off. Air supplies dropped missed
him again.
On Christmas Day Combat Command B reverted to division control
and assembled in the division area, except for Task Force McGeorge
which moved to the Combat Command A Sector.
In the morning Combat Command A attacked to secure the objective
line, and Task Force McGeorge attacked to retake Grandmenil and
restore road blocks to the east. On 26 December, the town was
secured, and the combat command objective was reported taken.
Combat Command B sent a tank company and an infantry company
to secure the division right flank by occupying the high ground
and crossroad in the vicinity of Melreux.
In Marcouray Hogan prepared to destroy his equipment and infiltrate
back to friendly lines after dark.
Two attempts to supply the task force by air failed. A German
officer had visited Hogan and demanded surrender. Hogan refused
the ultimatum and continued to defend his position.
The troops of Task Force Hogan beat back enemy patrols, taking
a few prisoners. They were in position to observe the enemy'
s movements and direct artillery fire on German columns and installations.
"Destroy all Equipment ... and Return on Foot"
Casualties suffered in Marcouray were relatively light but
the situation looked almost helpless when the division ordered
Task Force Hogan to destroy all equipment in place and return
on foot to the American lines.
All equipment had to be destroyed without burning or demolition
to avoid attracting attention. Motors were run without oil and
with sugar added to the gasoline. Sand and dirt was put into
transmissions and other moving parts. Weapons were rendered useless
by destroying and burying certain parts. When this was finished
about dark, the task force started north in groups of 20 at 20
minute intervals with only individual arms and such personal
equipment as they felt able to carry over ten miles of wooded,
snow-covered mountains. The wounded had to be left behind. A
medical officer, a dental officer, and several aid men volunteered
to stay with them. The prisoners were guarded by one of the less
seriously wounded. By noon the following day all but a few of
the 400 had returned safely and reequipping was under way.
On 26 December Task Force Kane was withdrawn from their positions
south of the main line of resistance of Combat Command A under
heavy fog cover along trails through Sadzot. The division front
then seemed pretty solid except for the left flank where contact
had not been made with the 7th Armored Division. Four enemy tanks
in dug-in positions on the high ground north of the road junction
at Grandmenil were still causing considerable trouble. Contact
had to be made by patrol at the Grandmenil road junction.
Combat Command B took over Combat Command AR sector on 27
December. The defenses were improved and some elements of the
3rd Armored conducted what maintenance and rehabilitation was
possible in assembly area near the front lines.
There was only one action of note on the 3rd Armored Division
front on the 28 December. It started soon after midnight on 27
December and developed into a somewhat confused battle in and
around Sadzot in Combat Command A's sector. The troops refer
to this action as "The Sad Sack Affair."
German forces headed into the woods south of the town through
a gap that existed in the defensive line established between
la Fosse and Amonines. The enemy forces had pushed into Sadzot
and were being resisted by C Company, 87th Chemical Battalion
and forward elements of the 54th Armored Field Artillery Battalion.
Fighting continued that night as Task Force Richardson, 509th
PIR Battalion, and elements of Combat Command A moved toward
Sadzot to help defend the town. As the commanding general of
Combat Command A arrived in Sadzot on the morning of 28 December
he discovered that the town had not been completely lost as previously
reported. Elements of the 87th Chemical Battalion resisted the
enemy strongly and held several houses in the north part of town.
By mid-day the enveloping companies of the 509th joined south
of the town.
The enemy forces killed, wounded, or captured in this attack
were about 90 men.
There was sniper fire in the woods north of the east-west
road through Grandmenil, so strong patrols were ordered to comb
the woods to determine enemy positions and strength. Forces were
also sent to close the gap and resist any attempt by the enemy
to break out of the enveloping action.
The 509th was ordered to attack southeast from Sadzot. It
began on the morning of 29 December. The advance met an enemy
attack of two companies of panzer grenadiers supported by two
75mm anti-tank guns.
Three light tanks were lost, but the paratroopers soon overran
the enemy guns and inflicted severe losses. The shock of this
engagement was considerable and the 509th withdrew slightly about
noon to reorganize. At this time Company A, 83rd Armored Reconnaissance
Battalion was committed to the attack. Very light resistance
was met.
While these movements were in progress, the responsibility
for the sector passed from the 3rd Armored to the 75th Infantry
Division. General Hickey, however, remained in command, his forces
being attached to 75th Division. On the morning of 30 December,
the lines were well established and Combat Command A moved with
the rest of the division to the assembly area in the vicinity
of Ocquier-Ouffet.
From 30 December to 2 January, the 3rd Armored remained in
assembly areas in the Ocquier-Ouffet area and rested and refitted
preparatory to the launching of a counter offensive at liquidating
the German's Ardennes salient.
To Backtrack: 3rd Armored's First Casualties
Our first casualties happened before the Spearhead was committed
in the Bulge! This has been ascertained due to research by John
Bauserman of Sterling, VA and obtaining first hand accounts from
survivors of the event called the Malmedy Massacre, but which
actually took place at Baugnez, a crossroads four kilometers
south of Malmedy by Peipers 1st SS, the most vicious enemy group
encountered by anyone in the Bulge.
Affected were men from the reconnaissance company of the 32nd
Armored Regiment, commanded by Colonel L.L. Doan and they could
only have made the reconnaissance on 17 December, the day after
the beginning, on his command and with the knowledge of General
Doyle 0. Hickey of Combat Command B.
Henry R. Zach of Danbury, Wisconsin, relates that the recon
company was stationed near Breinig, Germany at the time and had
been used as military government police. According to Walter
J. Wendt of Appelton, Wisconsin, on 17 December, 11 men in four
jeeps left early in the morning, went back through the dragon's
teeth to Eupen, Belgium, and then south when they ran into a
German column in fog and were captured.
Only the two officers, 1st Lieutenant Thomas E. McDermott
and 2nd Lieutenant Lloyd A. James, knew what their mission was.
Zach, the platoon sergeant, did not.
On capture their questioning was brief. They were waved into
the German column and started cross country. Wendt's jeep got
stuck in the mud and the guard threatened to kill him. He was
the only one with some command of German.
Zack's jeep, containing him and the two lieutenants, stripped
its transmission and they were put on a lead tank until they
came up with another German task force at a cafe (Baugnez) with
the new column having "a whole bunch of captured Americans."
Wendt says, of their approach to Baugnez, "As we were
moving, the tanks in front were shooting at our supply trucks
a distance away. Then to our left I noticed a column of American
trucks and other vehicles. I heard later it was an artillery
unit of some kind. They had no heavy guns. They were also taken
prisoner."
The prisoners, estimated by Wendt at 125, were then herded
into a field and, he says, "A German halftrack with a howitzer
mounted on it was trying to line up the barrel with us prisoners.
I guess he couldn't get the barrel low enough to blow us up,
so then a German car pulled up with a couple of officers. They
were smoking Camel cigarettes.
Then the officer stood up, reached into his holster, pulled
out his pistol and started firing. Four or five men dropped.
Then the tanks started moving and as they passed they turned
their machine guns and fired. I dropped before I was hit. A second
later several bodies fell over me. I was hit in my left elbow."
Then German guards, on foot, came by shooting survivors. One
of whom was Zach, shot the second time by a guard in his left
thigh. The guard was kicking to see who was dead.
Wendt escaped with several others, towards a garage type structure,
to find a German tank behind it. They passed within ten feet
of a surprised tank crew to a creek covered with a small amount
of ice. Eventual recovery and evacuation to England. Zach was
rescued on the 18th after having crawled under tin roof slabs
at the cafe.
Killed in action were the two lieutenants, John Klukavy and
James G. McGee, all buried at Henri Chapelle except Lieutenant
McDermott, whose body was returned to Yeadon, Pennsylvania.
Survivors were: Vemon Anderson of Mt. Pleasant, Pennsylvania,
taken prisoner; William E. Barrow, Memphis, Tennessee; Edward
J. Bojarski, a corporal from Menasha, Wisconsin; J.I. Cummings,
Bakersfield, California; Marvin J. Lewis, Wendt, and Zach.
Prior to the Bulge the German high command and U.S. 12th Army
Group were virtually in accord as to the German's capability.
Field Marshall von Rundstedt assessed their maximum as an attack
in the Aachen area, but neither took into account Hitler's intentions,
his ultimate objective being Antwerp. However, a map taken from
a captured German officer by the 3rd Armored about 21 December
showed Liege as an intermediate objective, with which Lyman B.
Kirkpatrick, Jr. in his Captains Without Eyes published
by the Macmillan Company 1969 agrees. More to the point, so did
the fuel hungry commanders on the ground, and they were not adverse
to American cigarettes, rations and Hershey bars.
The Bulge - Miscellaneous Reports
Nearly everyone found the German attack in the Ardennes a
matter of surprise, but it was not as much a surprise to some
as it was to others. Colonel Benjamin A. Dickson, 1st Army G-2,
a West Point graduate and New York lawyer did state in his Estimate
No. 37 of 10 December 1944, that the Germans were capable of
a major attack anywhere on the 1st Army front. Apparently the
operations chiefs found this unthinkable.
But there had been telltale signs. After U.S. Treasury Secretary
Morgenthau in the fall of 1944 announced a postwar scorched earth
policy for Germany, we in the Stolberg area ceased getting prisoners
of war, who, up until that time, were drifting over to our lines
nearly every night, affording us a considerable source of intelligence.
This now stopped, but this was not our only source. VII Corps
had a radio intercept unit which indicated the build up of armored
forces in the Paderborn area. The 2nd SS Panzer Division had
notoriously unsecured radio procedure. In addition, the air force
kept us informed through tactical reconnaissance reports transmitted
via teletype of rail traffic converging on Prum and through Cologne
all in the direction opposite the Ardennes. True, vital secure
messages in Germany were sent by officer courier or tested telephone
lines, but indications were there of an impending attack. They
were largely ignored.
By 5 p.m. 19 December, Division Headquarters, with only Combat
Command R under its command, left for an all night drive to Hotton.
Meanwhile, Combat Command B, which had been working
with the 30th Infantry Division under XVIII Airborne Corps, and
its Task Force Lovelady became entangled with the most notorious
German commander in the Bulge, Obersturmbann-Fuehrer Joachim
Peiper, whose troops perpetrated the massacre of U.S. soldiers
including some from the Recon Company, 32nd Armored Regiment.
Not so well known was their equally senseless slaughter of 24
Belgium civilians at Parfondruy, revealed by Lovelady's troops.
And it was Lovelady's men who succeeded in neutralizing Peiper's
force and causing its withdrawal.
Division Headquarters, once at Hotton on the morning of the
20th, shucked off excess personnel, spent the night near Erezee
and moved on to Manhay for a two night stay. Subsequently Hotton
was attacked and, with a mixed force, held, while Manhay was
attacked Christmas eve.
But, on first arrival, General Rose sent his meager forces
forward, Task Forces commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Matthew
Kane on the left, Lieutenant Colonel Samuel Hogan on the right
and Lieutenant Colonel William Orr in the center. Hogan subsequently
was surrounded at Marcouray, but escaped on foot Christmas eve
night and by that time the entire division with both combat commands
was under division control. Combat Command A having been under
army control against threatened parachute forces during the initial
scare.
General James M. Gavin, commander of the 82nd Airborne Division,
under XVIII Airborne Corps, complains in his book. On To Berlin,
of Mahay being "deserted" by the 3rd Armored command
post on 24 December. His book was written long after the event,
but when he spoke to General Rose on the 21st, the 3rd Armored
was under XVIII Airborne Corps and the 82nd Airborne Division
was on our left flank. By the 24th the 3rd Armored was back under
VII Corps and the 7th Armored Division had been slipped in between
the 82nd and 3rd Armored on the road through Manhay. Also, he
apparently did not recall the action of Field Marshall Bernard
L. Montgomery in ordering the defense line drawn back north of
Manhay. Gavin's relations with his corps commander, Major General
Matthew B. Ridgeway, were prickly.
American "Secret Weapon"
If there was one "secret" weapon possessed by the
Americans at this time it was the artillery, particularly when
we began using the pozit fuse, which caused airbursts. They were
far more devastating than shells which exploded on hitting the
surface.
Largely unreported at this time was the damages suffered by
the Belgian civilian population at Liege, which had been receiving
hits by Buzz bombs for weeks on end. Considerable damage to structures
and a number of deaths and wounds were attributed to the V-l
attacks.
In the early part of the Bulge, Task Force Lovelady, as usual
in Combat Command B but attached to the 30th Division, encountered,
fought and neutralized the most vicious group encountered anywhere
in the Ardennes -- KG Joachim Peiper, the perpetrators of the
massacre at Malmedy, who also killed 24 at Parfondruy.
The after action report of Combat Command B reported the atrocities
against civilians by Peiper's 1st SS troops. It was in the Parfoundruy
area that members of Task Force Lovelady saw evidence of the
atrocities committed by the 1st SS Division against Belgium civilians.
In the vicinity of 705006 there were four adults killed in cold
blood. In one house, six small children were found hacked to
death with knives. At 678993 approximately 10 men, women and
children had been herded into a house and then shot. These atrocity
stories were reported and the 30th Infantry Division sent representatives
to get full details.
During the night 22-23 December the enemy attempted to drop
paratroopers as well as supplies in the Stourmont and LaGleize
sectors. Twenty-two paratroopers were captured in Stourmont.
Lovelady's force benefited from the fortuitous blowing of
the bridges at Trois Ponts and the Lienne at Chevron by men of
the 51st Combat Engineer Battalion, thus preventing Peiper from
an anticipated advance to beyond the Meuse. Peiper came in like
a tornado, left slinking on foot in the dark and through a very
cold stream.
Long after the war, Colonel John A. Smith, Jr., our chief
of staff, would, when a few drinks taken, tell of the return
of General Hickey and his command. In his way of telling, a worried
General Rose sat staring at a disappointing situation map when
there arrived a rosy cheeked Brigadier General Doyle 0. Hickey,
smoking his pipe, as usual and, in pulling off his gloves, said:
"I told you fellows you would get in trouble going off by
yourselves."
Smith portrayed this as happening under dim lamplight but
in fact the signal company always provided us with a portable
generator of considerable capacity, which was also put to use
by officers with electric shavers.
German Soldiers in GI Uniforms
Combat Command A, which was the first initially committed
to the Bulge (see the G-3 Supplement) for the defense of Eupen,
where a few German paratroopers were found and captured or killed.
However, the impact of these paratroopers and another specialized
type of German troops far outweighed their numbers and capacity.
It was the scare tactics.
The other group was Colonel Otto Skorzeny's 150th Panzer Brigade,
made up of German soldiers in American uniforms and with American
equipment, as far as was possible, with English speaking soldiers
scattered through the command. His headquarters company, in particular,
was completely "Americanized."
In an operation called Grief, Skorzeny on 16 December sent
out jeep teams -- seven vehicles -- to work behind American lines
and cause confusion. This they did. One team, led by a former
German merchant mariner, entered Malmedy and later said he stopped
and had a drink with GIs in a cafe before reporting back.
Later our artillery did much damage and brought causalities
to Skorzeny's men at Malmedy and our air corps, called in, unfortunately
bombed on the wrong side of the line.
But the result of English-speaking German soldiers in our
uniforms had an effect on GIs they had never before experienced.
They became security conscious, to an extreme. Woe betide the
officer not able to name the capitol of a GI's home state, or
who won the last World Series.
Combat Command A returned home to the division 21 December,
just in time.
When Division Headquarters arrived at Hotton early in the
morning of 20 December, then proceeded to near Erezee for the
night, proceeding to Manhay the next day, what was to become
a line of departure had been established, one which sustained
German incursions on both ends, Hotton and Manhay, and the middle
and approaching sections, (Erezee and Sadzot), before the action
was over.
As the whole battle progressed it became more like Mortain,
but on a far grandeur scale. U.S. forces built up shoulders on
either side of the German advance and held firm and, as the penetration
became deeper, submitting each passing element to a gauntlet
of fire as the line became thinner and thinner and opposing troops
extended themselves.
Once we went on the offensive and the penetration containing
the battle developed more on the lines of the Falaise Gap, the
Germans were harassed on both sides in their squeeze out, as
opposed to cutting off the Germans near their frontier. Field
Marshal von Rundstedt, the German commander, called ours "the
small solution."
Before this could come to pass there was a lot of hard fighting,
with Combat Command R initially committing the task forces of
Kane, Hogan and Onto find and fix opposing forces. Hogan, on
the right, found them soon enough, as outlined in the G-3 Supplement,
ending up on a hilltop and surrounded at Marcouray despite what
was understood to be General Rose's assurance that he would "back
him up." Hogan's position was not, however, entirely disadvantageous,
being a fine forward observation post for our artillery.
Task Force Orr reached Samree initially and Task Force Kane
approached Dochamps before being checked and both pulled back
slightly and held in extremely bad weather and adverse circumstances.
24 December - a Sore Spot for the 3AD
What follows is the Twas The Night Before Christmas (And
All Did Not Go Well) account which was published, in French,
in the Belgian society called CRIBA, which concerns the Battle
of the Bulge. This is followed by, according to British author
Iris Carpenter, Monty's attempts at the same "line straightening"
over beyond our left flank and his authorization for the 2nd
Armored Division to withdraw when, instead, it attacked. Following
this is a heretofore unpublished account of one of Monty's staff
officers delivery of "for the eyes of the division commander
only" message to Colonel John A. Smith, Jr., chief of staff,
in the absence of General Rose, to prepare to withdraw.
Following the events of the 24th, Lieutenant Colonel Walter
Richardson's task force had the indignity of, in addition to
the German tank incursion, being bombed by our own air corps
at Grandmesnil.
The good thing about Christmas Day was that Combat Command
B returned to our fold.
Twas The Night Before Christmas And All Did Not Go Well
The night before Christmas action around Baraque de Fraiture
and Manhay, that is the main road from Liege to Houfflaize, remains
a sore spot to those of the 3rd Armored Division most intimately
concerned.
The action started the morning of the 24th when the task force
of Major F. Olin Brewster (Headquarters/32nd Armored Regiment)
had knocked out some 2nd SS Panzer Division armored cars at a
deep cut in the road with trees on both sides which confined
wheeled and track traffic to the road. Weather permitting, P-47
planes were called and credited with knocking out nine German
tanks, but the day was not over, for the 2nd SS sent tanks to
Brewster's left flank to come in behind him near Belle Haie.
Brewster contacted his commander, Lieutenant Colonel Walter B.
Richardson (32nd Armored Regiment) on the radio for instructions
and was told to withdraw to the northeast through Malempre and
join him. Richardson then moved his command post to nearby Grandmenil,
where Task Force Kane (Lieutenant Colonel Matthew W. Kane, 32nd
Armored Regiment) had his command post.
Brewster, attempting to withdraw through Malempre, lost two
of his four tanks, met both tank and small arms fire in the town
and was fired on from the rear. At this point he rendered his
vehicles immobile and under orders withdrew his troops on foot,
being two platoons of H Company of the 32nd Armored Regiment,
a company of the 509th Parachute Infantry and a company from
the green 75th Infantry Division. Most of them got back safely,
including Brewster.
When the 3rd Armored was fully committed on 20 December when
division headquarters and Combat Command R took the line from
Hotton to Manhay and started working forward of it to find the
Germans, coming under XVIII Airborne Corps, freshly brought from
England. Combat Command B was attached to the 30th Infantry Division,
also under XVIII Airborne Corps, while Combat Command A was held
in the Eupen area as a defense force. The following day, the
21st, Combat Command A was reattached to the division, assembling
near Grandmenil. On the 23rd, 3rd Armored, less Combat Command
B, went back under VII Corps control, where we felt at home,
while Combat Command A of the 7th Armored Division, fresh from
the St. Vith defense area, where it had been sorely tried, was
prepared to squeeze in between the 3rd Armored and the 82nd being
under the airborne corps. In this change 7th Armored was to take
over the defense of the crucial Manhay road block.
At this time Field Marshall Bernard Law Montgomery, who had
been placed in charge of the north side of the Bulge, decreed
a "straightening of the Line." If this sounds confusing,
you should have been privy to what went on there at the time.
There follows an explanation of "orders from on high"
according to Lieutenant Thomas E. Shockley, who was assistant
artillery communications commanding officer of the 82nd Airborne
Division, in a letter to the writer:
"To answer your question as to Monty's 'line straightening'
order tersely and sufficiently ... On the 24th all commanders
from Hodges (1st Army) on down through Ridgeway's corps and including
VII Corps element officers were briefed and prepared on withdrawal
plan to (MLR) main line of resistance along Hotton, Soy, Erezee,
Manhay, Tri Ie Cheslaing, Bra, Trois Ponts line...Noon 24th Monty
appears XVIII Corps Command Post, orders that Manhay not be included
in main line of resistance but to include high ground north of
Manhay and only outpost the town. Colonel Dwight A. Rosenbaum
(commanding officer Combat Command A 7th Armored Division) did
not receive orders on plan change until 1800 hours and vehemently
protested. No time for reconnaissance, it was dark, giving up
an excellent defensive position for an inferior one, etc.
"While Rosenbaum's Combat Command A was withdrawing through
its hastily thrown up covering screen the panzers and panzer
grenadiers of 2nd SS Panzer Division struck, and stuck hard.
Without adequate infantry forces in the screen they simply folded
and broke.
"Taking into consideration all the factors of the situation,
one of those being that Combat Command A troops were trying to
recoup from about 144 hours of continuous combat, the outcome
was a foregone conclusion ...
"As a result of this so called 'debacle', which would
not have occurred if Monty had not put his finger in the pie
in this particular area (witness perfect execution in all other
sectors!) Ridgeway had Brigadier General Robert W. Hasbrouck
replace Rosenbaum. C'est la guerre!"
That is Shockley's account of orders from on high and augments
the account of Brewster's dilemma as recounted in Hugh M. Cole's
The Ardennes: the Battle of the Bulge, pages 584-590.
In the September 1986 issue of the 3rd Armored Newsletter,
Gordon Williamson, who was researching for a book on the German
Knights Cross of the Iron Cross, told of meeting SS Panzer NCO
Ernest Barkman of the 2nd Panzer Division 'Das Reich', who "found
himself in the U.S. occupied village of Manhay, bluffing his
way through the American troops" and hitting a fast backing-up
U.S. jeep. Did the occupant escape unharmed, Barkman inquired?
This was answered in the 1986 December Newsletter by William
F. Oliver (H/32nd Armored Regiment), who said: "I was not
one of the jeep drivers but I was there when it happened. We
were on the road block at the intersection at Manhay. We were
told that six tanks were coming through our position from the
7th Armored Division. I was a tank driver and myself, my gunner
and tank commander were standing alongside of our tank when they
came through.
"When they came through their tanks had a lot of brush
and small trees attached to them. When the first tank came through
the tank commander waved at us and we greeted him back. The same
with the second tank and the third and fourth and fifth and sixth
and seventh. Because of the brush and in the half moonlight they
all looked alike. We felt good that tankers from another division
greeted us this way. All seven tanks. After they had gone through
and up the road behind us it dawned on me that there were seven
tanks, not six like we had been told. I mentioned this to my
gunners and my tank commander. My tank commander went over and
mentioned it to the colonel. It wasn't much later when we heard
the firing behind us which confirmed my suspicions.
"Needless to say the road block was useless. All hell
broke loose after that." Major Murray Fowler, in the G-3
supplement to the 3rd Armored Division history. Spearhead
in the West, says: "At about the same time the 7th Armored
Division elements started moving back through Manhay, eight enemy
tanks and some infantry moved northeast out of Odeigne and got
behind Richardson's road block. These tanks moved rapidly on
Manhay, which was then full of traffic and not very strongly
defended, and soon got into the town and opened fire on several
houses and vehicles."
Grandmenil was also overrun about 3 a.m. Christmas morning
and was later in the day attacked by Task Force McGeorge of Combat
Command B, which was reattached to the division on Christmas
day, but the town was not taken until the 26th.
Alan Moorehead, in his biography of Montgomery and his quest
for control of all allied ground troops, says: "It was impossible
for Montgomery not to believe that he had agitated all through
the dark autumn days of 1944 for a new organization of command;
that it took the crisis of the Ardennes and a really first-class
row to get what he wanted. Then all went well."
It depends on whom one asks as to whether "all went well."
Monty's Line Straightening
In Twas The Night Before Christmas we learned of the
difficulties in line straightening imposed by Field Marshall
Bernard Law Montgomery on taking command of the north side of
the Bulge, of the adverse effect it had on our Lieutenant Colonel
Walter B. Richardson and how his task force centered on his battalion
of the 32nd Armored Regiment in the Manhay area.
We were not the only ones affected by his line straightening
or attempt in that direction. Iris Carpenter was a British war
correspondent, sometimes with us at the 3rd Armored, but covering
the 1st Army front. In her book No Woman's World and her
chapter on the Ardennes she says: "The Bulge looked like
a Christmas stocking with the toe snagged out of it. Monty had
taken over to move in so many divisions that we began wondering
if he intended to leave the troops room to fight.
"His first suggestion upon assuming command had been
to straighten the line between Malmedy and Monchau and give up
the hot corner at Butgenbach. Had General Hodges agreed it would
have been a very different Battle of the Bulge story for the
1st Division.
"Instead, the general pointed out that thousands of men
and vehicles could not be moved back over the one swampy road
south of Eupen without enormous losses and got the British commander's
permission to leave well enough alone."
This was beyond our left flank where the area below the Elsenborn
ridge was held like a rock by the 1st and 2nd Infantry Divisions
and others.
Over beyond our right flank Monty authorized VII Corps, commanded
by our own General J. Lawton Collins, to make a substantial withdrawal.
Instead, the 2nd Armored Division attacked, caught the 2nd
SS Panzer Division out of gas in the Celles area and that marked
the point of furthest advance the Germans made. So much for Monty's
line straightening.
And one of the most telling accounts of it was made by a rosy
cheeked English woman war correspondent, who was on the ground
and knew whereof she spoke.
An Unreported Christmas Eve Action
Charles B. MacDonald, in his monumental book on the Bulge,
A Time for Trumpets, says of one action: "It was
just one of those incidents that happened often in the Ardennes
when a ... small group of men came briefly upon the scene, did
a job, then passed on without record."
There follows one such account, also on the 24th and therefore
consistent with enemy action on either side of the Hotton area,
as given by Jack B. Warden. While firm confirmation is lacking,
his account has the ring of truth.
Jack B. Warden came to the 3rd Armored Division from Fort
Knox in 1943 when the division was at Indiantown Gap, Pennsylvania.
He was fortunate in that it was considered the best post we had.
His luck did not continue.
Assigned to B Company of the 36th Armored Infantry Regiment
he went to the 3rd Platoon. Given a battlefield commission as
2nd Lieutenant in France, he made 1st lieutenant in 61 days,
before he got his AG card.
In a letter to Tom Shockley, the Bulge researcher, who was
assistant communications officer of the 82nd Airborne Division,
Warden begins with the December 10-13 action of the 3rd Armored
and others to get to the Roer River, across which lay the Cologne
plain. Emerging from that understrength and in need of refitting
he was given short shift of both, receiving but two replacements
before sent, as recalled, early on to the Bulge, where his first
assignment was to search for German paratroopers, about which
there was at the time a phobia, although many of the parachutes
dropped dummies. Warden found houses of Belgians who had seen
some paratroopers, but he found none.
It is well to mention that the rear area search for paratroopers
(and also being held in army reserve) fell to Combat Command
A of the 3rd Armored.
Spearhead in the West lists B/36th under Task Force
Lovelady in the early days of the Bulge, while Warden says that
he normally was under Lieutenant Colonel William R. Orr, who
was part of Combat Command R - Reserve - commanded by the 36th
Commanding Officer, Colonel Robert L. Howze. But, says Warden,
he was frequently shifted from one task force to another without
knowing it. Compounding his difficulties when assigned to the
Bulge was that besides being understrength, he went with but
17 men and two halftracks, he had no radio and no maps.
His connection with events leading to Hotton came about 9
a.m. 24 December when he was ordered to Ny, by whom he does not
recall but by this time Combat Command A had been, on the 21st,
reattached to the division.
There follows, with all pertaining to Hotton given in his
own words in his letter to Shockley, without change, the events
which follows, specifically those of December 24 and 25 as recalled
through the mists of time and the confusion of war. This was
at the time the Germans attacked Manhay, Lieutenant Colonel Samuel
Hogan followed his men out of Marcouray where they had been surrounded
and Lieutenant Colonel Walter B. Richardson was catching hell
at Grandmenil. Was a smaller secondary action at Hotton missed
in the general roundup? Had the scratch force of clerks, signal
personnel and engineers under Major Jack W. Fickessen been relieved?
Warden says that on Christmas Day his 1st Sergeant, John Ahearn,
came by looking for him and Orr radioed that Warden was not under
him. James Buhler, the company clerk, now of New Orleans, did
not recall Warden's assignment. Yet Warden fought and fought
well. Here is his letter:
"I have ordered books and read everything I could find
on the Bulge and from Normandy on. Most of the stuff I found
made me wonder if I was in a different war or slept through WWII.
I asked all three of the people, the 1st sergeant, company clerk,
supply sergeant and found they could not remember any better
than I about specific actions and missions. There were only two
of us original men on the line everyday who made it through all
campaigns and the other one, L.B. Tippi, died July 16, 1988.
He lived only about 80 miles from Austin, in Burnet, Texas. Captain
Brian Grover had four campaigns and was in the Bulge and was
coming in to the reunion but died a month before. I'm sorry I
have blocked out as much that it all seems like a dream.
"I find all accounts to be about the same as if all writers
copied the first account written and I think they are wrong on
many of the dates and combat commands as well. Many times I would
jump off under one task force and end up with another and never
know why. Anyway the following is all I remember of the entire
Bulge except scattered incidents.
"On 10 December, jumped off for Echtz and Hoven at 4
p.m., failed to get air or tank support and lost my radio early
and was catching our own artillery as well as direct fire from
tanks and ack-ack from the Germans. Lost the whole company by
a couple of new officers who had no combat and went nuts. By
the time I got orders to withdraw from William Orr the battalion
commanding officer, I only had 14 men and myself left. I had
sent my runner back for help on lifting the artillery and getting
the tanks up. The 15 of us did take the objective by going in
on their flank. We were relieved on the 13th to go back to Stolberg
and get re-equipped. I only received two replacements on the
15th. Don't remember how many more men we got, but we were close
to half strength.
"On 16 December 1944, got orders to move out, would get
equipment on the way to the Bulge. Traveled all night leading
the vehicles on foot with a pin hole in flashlight. At this time
we were c/c Orr. Don' t recall what or where until 24 December
around 9 a.m. I received orders to go to Ny. Just as I got there,
two small tanks under John J. Modrack 2nd Lieutenant arrived.
Then two medium tanks under 1st Lieutenant Smith from San Antonio,
Texas arrived. Both only had half crews for each tank, 'But hell,
the Germans were outnumbered with two Texans on the scene.' Over
Smith' s radio we were ordered to Hotton where friends were in
trouble. As we got to Hotton there was small arms fire from the
last building which had wounded and Medics in it. The Medics
were shooting at the Germans who were using the houses for cover
and attacking them. This was the northeast edge of town and about
50 yards west of bridge. I told the doctor to get his people
out as soon as we cleared the town. He could use one of the engineers'
6x6 sitting in the street. They nor the Germans had disabled
their equipment. As we pushed into the town up the street, a
German tank came on the scene and we took him out with a bazooka.
"We cleared the houses and found engineers in the cellars
with the local people. Sent them on their way as we didn't need
anyone who wouldn't fight. There were about ten houses on the
river front we cleared, and we did not take prisoners as we had
no place to keep or send them. We took the 50 caliber from the
trucks of the engineers and set our defense in the houses and
placed our post at the embankment about 300 yards from the houses.
Set our tanks up for crossfire and reported on Smith's radio
the objective secured. Our orders were now, to hold the bridge
at all cost. The bridge was set to blow if we failed to hold.
At this time we found the 84th Infantry had troops across the
bridge and would blow the bridge if they broke through us. We
asked some stupid major over there to give us artillery support
in case of attack. He declined as he thought they might need
all their guns themselves. We thanked him for his kind consideration
and assured him he would b e the last to know if we were overrun.
"The scene as I recall was the river going east and west
curving around south around the eastern edge of Hotton. About
75 or 100 yards from the river to road in front of houses. Then
the houses following curve of river as was the railroad on the
embankment about 300 yards from houses north of river. Reminded
of the good old days in the hedgerows. I had hoped for a setup
like this since the early days and here it was. Everything had
to come over the embankment and across the field before they
got that bridge. Since I had had no sleep for some time I stretched
out on the floor. At that moment about 7 p.m. Smith yelled 'here
they come!' They did indeed come pouring over the R/R and across
the field. As the tanks exposed their belly, Smith's five's took
them out. He got six and we got three with bazookas. We littered
the field with dead and only one tank got into the field before
we stopped him. Smith lost one tank to a Panzerfaust and the
two tankers were wounded. I had one man slightly wounded. The
prisoners we took said they had about 1500 men and nine tanks
and had promised Hitler Liege for Christmas. 'We were sorry about
that.' They radioed back for reinforcements as they had hit a
heavily defended position. The action ended around midnight and
we were ready for Christmas. We killed a calf and some chickens
for dinner.
"There were no other Americans, not 143 Armored Signal
Company, no M.P.'s and, unless the people in the cellars were
23rd Engineers, no engineers. If these people had a similar battle,
it had to be in another pan of Hotton. We were not aware of any
action from across the river. We were completely out of touch
with any one except the radio man on Smith's radio and the only
time I talked with him I assumed it was Colonel Orr. However,
about 2 p.m. the 25th B Company, 1st sergeant came driving up
looking for me. He said no one knew where I was. I told him I
was sent here by 'Seven William,' Colonel Orr's handle. He asked
Orr about me and was told he didn't know.
"About 7 or 8 a.m. Christmas day a one-star general and
about a platoon of paratroopers came through and he congratulated
us on a job well done. I asked them to stay for lunch but he
declined and said that they were looking for a fight. I told
him we took Christmas off in the infantry. He was amused, but
left anyway.
"I have always said the only way we won the war was we
were more screwed up than the Germans. Of course we all know
the war was won by the battalion commanders and up, who planned
very carefully all the action.
"When you are on the firing line, you are not bothered
by the reporters or battalion commanders. They spend their time
from battalion to regiment to division. Never one time was I
asked anything about any battle by a reporter. Their interest
was with the big picture because they were not under fire and
did not like sleeping in a foxhole and eating K ration.
"We were successful on the line 'as you well know' because
of the support of our artillery and F/0 and P-47, P-51, P-38's
doing a great job and our buddies with the old M-l never faltering."
SOME MEMORIES [returning again to the author]: As Andy Barr
says, we battled not only Germans, but weather and, occasionally,
each other, the latter for what became knows as the Bitter Battle
for Billets in the Belgium Bulge. An example is that on January
8, Division Headquarters moved into the staff quarters of the
national insane asylum at Liemeux, which were quite comfortable,
particularly when we sent out trucks back to the Stolberg area
for coal. Soon, however, VII Corps appeared, took our fine, warm
quarters and relinquished us to the patients quarters, which
had been heavily bombed. Afterwards, however, we were able to
say that both parties had been in an insane asylum.
At some time in the Bulge, for the first and only time, some
of our tanks were reported dug in, hull down, with only the turret
exposed.
The pozit proximity fuse, affording air bursts, was at one
time reported to have caught a battalion of German infantry forming
for the attack. Afterwards bodies were found, untouched by shellfire,
but riddled with splinters. And it was cold, very cold.
3AD Roles in the Allied Counter Offensive
On 3 January, VII Corps started a new offensive to the southeast
with the 2nd and 3rd Armored Divisions abreast followed by the
84th and 83rd Infantry Divisions. The objective of their attack
was to drive rapidly to the southeast, with the armored leading,
seize Houffalize and its vital road net, and join up with the
3rd Army coming up from the south, thereby pocketing elements
of the German Army that had penetrated further to the west before
they could be withdrawn.
In the zone of the 3rd Armored, the attack was made with Combat
Commands A and B abreast. Combat Command B was on the right (west)
of the zone. Each combat command moved out to the attack in two
task force columns. Combat Command A commanded by Brigadier General
Hickey consisted of Task Force Doan and Task Force Richardson.
Combat Command B commanded by Brigadier General Boudinot consisted
of Task Force McGeorge and Task Force Lovelady.
In addition to the organic elements of the division, the strength
was bolstered by the attachment of 330th Infantry Regiment of
the 83rd Division and three artillery battalions, 83rd Armored,
991st, and 183rd. Each combat command had two battalions of infantry
and two battalions of artillery in direct support. If a penetration
could be effected quickly, it was felt that the forces were in
sufficient strength and depth to drive rapidly to the objective
Cherain and Bouvigny bypassing enemy pockets of resistance and
leaving them for the 83rd Division to mop up. That was how it
had worked all the way from the Seine to the Siegfried Line back
in August and September.
On this occasion, however, there were several factors that
prevented a duplication of that performance. The weather conditions
were such as to preclude effective lose support by air, and affected
adversely the use of our potentially overpowering artillery.
To secure its maximum effect, this artillery must have good visibility
and flying weather for its air observation planes. Snow and ice
slowed vehicular movement to a marked degree, and in may cases
rendered the columns roadbound. Cold weather, in itself, was
an obstacle. It reduced efficiency somewhat by rendering ordinary
physical tasks harder to perform. In addition, the Germans had
been given time from 30 December to 3 January to establish a
fair system of defense in depth, which continued to be improved
as the American intentions were sensed. The cumulative effect
of these conditions resulted in the division of the offensive
into three phases.
The first phase covered the period 3 to 9 January inclusive.
During this phase the division fought its way slowly against
strong rear guard actions reaching a line Provedroux-Ottre-Regne-Cross
Roads 576853.
The next phase was from 9 to 13 January. During this period,
the 3rd Armored was passed through by the 83rd Infantry Division
whose mission was to continue the attack to the southeast through
the heavily wooded area that ran across the 3rd Armored zone
in a band three to four miles deep beginning at the line reached
by the 3rd on 9 January. They were to establish a bridgehead
on the south side of this woods on a line Bouvigny-Baclain-Mont
Ie Ban.
This line was not reached in its entirety when the 3rd Armored
resumed the attack on 13 January, beginning the third phase of
the action. This phase was characterized by many bitter battles
of attrition against strong villages, culminating in the seizing
of Brisy and the high ground in that vicinity north of the Ourthe
River on 19 January.
The portion of the German salient west of Houffalize had been
liquidated, but the enemy had conducted an efficient withdrawal.
The effort had cost the Germans heavily, but the had succeeded
in withdrawing a very large part of their forces not expended
in the 15 days of stubborn rearguard actions 3 to 16 January.
In rare cases was the enemy forced to give ground where the loss
would seriously endanger the extrication of the carefully hoarded
German armor without inflicting severe losses on the attacking
force.
On 20-21 January 1945, the division was relieved by elements
of the 4th Cavalry Groups and the 84th Infantry Division. The
3rd Armored Division then moved to an assembly area in the Barvaux-Durby
area for rest and rehabilitation.
During the rest period there is plenty of work to do. The
"rest" means that you are not in contact with the enemy.
New reinforcements have to be fitted into their places and given
additional training. New equipment has to be tested, and there
is maintenance work in whatever quantity time permits. It is
a time of rest, though. There is time for a few movies and recreation
convoys to nearby cities, and there is time to count score.
The decisive action in the Ardennes salient lasted for 16
December 1944 to 16 January 1945.
For this period there are two sets of concrete figures that
can be juggled at will to propagandize either the Allied cause
or the German. They are the losses of men and material on each
side.
Taken separately, loss figures may be used to prove almost
anything. Together they serve only to emphasize that it was a
hard fight.
During the period 16 December to 16 January, the 3rd Armored
Division suffered 1,473 battle casualties, of this number 21
officers and 166 enlisted men were killed in action. The rest
were wounded or missing.
Battle losses in vehicles were as follows:
Medium Tanks 125
Light Tanks 38
Artillery Pieces 6
Other Vehicles 158
A carefully prepared day to day estimate of losses inflicted
on the enemy for this period totals up to:
1,705 estimated killed
545 estimated wounded
2,510 prisoner (actual count)
The estimated vehicular casualties inflicted counting only
those know to have been destroyed are:
Tanks 98 (31 MK Vs)
Self-propelled Guns 20
Motor Transport 76
Anti-Tank or Anti-Aircraft Guns 23
Artillery Pieces 8
Next Chapter: Rhineland Campaign
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