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Those Damn Dams on the Roer River
Not long after we had crossed the dragon's teeth and established
division headquarters in the Prym house at Stolberg, our attention
focused on the upstream dams on the Roer River, controlled by
the Germans. This interest intensified in the November and December
attacks of 1944 in the approaches to the river. For with the
Germans in control, a successful river crossing could be endangered
if they blew the dams, flooding the river, while but a portion
of the attacking force was across.
At the same time, our photograph interpretation crew, working
from constantly updated air corps photographs, mapped the increasingly
more complex German trench system across the Roer.
With a cross Roer gambit scheduled for 23 February 1944, the
suspense ended. The Germans destroyed the discharge valves on
the dams and the Roer flooded for 12 days. But once done, it
could not be undone. The 104th and 8th Infantry Divisions made
their crossings, and the trench system so laboriously depicted
was undefended!
A word about the 104th. Their commander, Terry Allen, was
an old cavalryman and believed in mobility. Lacking sufficient
organic transportation for his infantry backing the 3rd Armored,
he employed captured trucks, tractors pulling trailers and anything
that would move to get his troops forward. It was quite a sight.
Gypsies!
The division wartime history. Spearhead in the West
and the pamphlet, Spearheading with the 3rd Armored Division,
cover this phase quite well, but there is one incident which
can be expanded on and William B. Breuer in his book, Storming
Hitler's Rhine, got it wrong.
On 2 March, division headquarters pulled into Niederaussem
and set up a temporary command post in a house on the left hand
side of the road, installing the situation map therein, on the
ground floor. Shortly thereafter a roving German assault gun
or tank landed a shell in the area, a fragment of which pierced
the situation map, landing exactly on our outlined objective
of the day. It is true that war correspondents could look out
the window and see the progress of the battle less than a thousand
yards away.
Shortly after the shelling Helen Kirkpatrick, war correspondent
for The Chicago Daily News, arrived and bundled up in
yea-many layers of clothes against the cold and rode in an open
jeep with the windshield down. Her first words were:
"Where is it?" A John was found and she was in it
for a very long time.
Then Major General J. Lawton Collins, VII Commander, arrived
and chewed out General Rose for having his Command Post so close
to the front. So then we were moved back a short distance to
a main crossroad opposite a church steeple, always the first
objective of hostile artillery! This was a better, safer place?
Tank Battle in Front of Cologne Cathedral
A word on the capture of Cologne, to be discussed later in
this section. It can hardly be overemphasized that the motion
pictures of the tank battle which took place in front of the
Dom in Cologne, the cathedral, taken by T/3 Leon Rosenman and
T/4 James Bates and their crew were said to be some of the best
photographed tank action of the war. In this a German Panther
tank is located in front of the cathedral (streets lead to the
cathedral like spokes in a wheel) and thought to be knocked out.
However, the turret suddenly turned on an American Sherman tank
and fired. The Sherman was hit and the commander slid down the
back of the tank, falling to the ground and bled to death. Then
a newly arrived U.S. M-26 Pershing tank with a 90mm gun took
on the Panther and knocked it out.
Other remembrances of Cologne: a city without utilities but
much broken glass. The blowing of the Hohenzollem bridge, behind
the cathedral, observed from a church tower with war correspondents.
After the city was cleared, showers were provided for GIs and
night-time artificial moonlight was provided by signal corps
searchlights shining upwards on clouds. The awarding of medals
and arrival of first rate entertainment. Wondering what was next.
Following capture another photo session ensued, with General
Rose, Hickey and Boudinot posing for a Life photographer
on the steps of the Dom Cathedral. It ran on the front of Life.
Little did we know that by the end of the month Rose would be
dead.
A last word on taking large towns. We had become blase and
wondered if the faucets worked and the toilets flushed.
The Rhineland and The Roer
After the Battle of the Bulge, the Spearhead Division rested
and refitted while the snow melted in the area Barvaux, Erezee,
Hotton, Maffe, Ocquier in Belgium. This refitting period continued
until 7 February 1945. On that fate the division started moving
back to familiar surroundings. The new assembly positions were
in the Stolberg, Brenig, Hastenrath, Werth area in Germany. VII
Corps took over a sector of the Roer front roughly corresponding
to the sector the Corps held in December when they left to take
pan in the Ardennes Campaign.
Facing the VII Corps Roer from, the enemy had two infantry
divisions totaling approximately 10,000 men
In addition to the Roer trench system, there was another belt
of enemy trenches to be met before reaching the Erft Canal. This
belt ran from southwest of Elsdorf, west of Etzweiler, west of
Manheim, west of Blatzheim, then down the western bank of the
Neffel River. Most of the villages were protected by strong trench
systems masking them potential strong points.
While the 8th and 104th Infantry Divisions of VII Corps prepared
to force crossings of the Roer in the vicinity of Duren, the
3rd Armored continued to refit and train reinforcements.
On 23 February, the 8th and 104th Divisions made initial crossings
of the Roer.
The plan for the operation called for the infantry divisions
to seize the Corps bridgehead line. When crossing were prepared
and the bridgehead secure, the 3rd Armored was to pass through
and attack northeast to seize the Elsdorf area and secure a bridgehead
across the Erft Canal in that vicinity, at the same time blocking
any attempt of the enemy to move troops north into Elsdorf area
by seizing Blatzheim, Kerpen Heppendorf and Sindorf. Elements
of the 8th and 104th Divisions were to follow the 3rd Armored
Division closely to secure the objective gained, allowing the
armor to continue to advance rapidly.
The three combat commands were again organized into task forces
commanded by Doan, Kane, Welbom, Lovelady, Hogan, and Richardson.
By 25 February, the Duren area was cleared, and it was apparent
that the Corps bridgehead line would be secured, almost in its
entirety by the following day. Accordingly, the 3rd Armored Division
was ordered to move into the bridgehead on the day of 25 February
and the night of 25-26 February.
At midnight, 25 February, Combat Commands A and B started
moving from the Stolberg area. Combat Command B used the two
north crossings; Combat Command A used the two south crossings.
Combat Command R in Division Reserve, followed Combat Command
B.
First Contact with German "People's Army"
It was on the drive to Elsdorf that the U.S. 1st Army first
contacted the German Volkssturm (People' s Army). A company of
Volkssturm troops, led by officers of the Wehrmacht, had the
mission of defending the entrances to the town of Berendorf.
When our troops were reported approaching the town, the Volkssturm
assembled and took up their defensive positions. The officers
made inspections to assure that everything was in order. Then
the officers disappeared.
The Volkssturm promptly abandoned their positions, assembled,
and waited for our troops to come in. They surrendered en masse.
Thus the first units of the highly publicized People's Army,
the strategic reserve so heavily counted on by Adolph Hitler
to sell each German town dearly, had collapsed. During the remainder
of the campaign there were only isolated cases of the People'
s Army putting up any sort of resistance.
The task forces of Combat Command A advanced against heavy
resistance but still took the towns of Buir, Manheim, Grouven
and Zieverich.
In the meantime, Combat Command B was meeting stubborn house-to-house
fighting in clearing out Elsdorf. All streets were heavily defended
by heavy log blocks and suicide bazooka teams, plus self-propelled
anti-tank guns. During the afternoon, the Germans launched a
counterattack supported by four Tiger tanks and two Mk IV's.
When this counterattack was broken up, the enemy tanks withdrew
to the east. Elsdorf was buttoned up by 1900, and Task Force
Hogan was moving through the eastern portion of Elsdorf in an
attack on Esch.
Task Force Kane in Combat Command A's sector moved into Heppendorf
and Sindorf against moderate resistance. However, to the south
Task Force Doan had beaten off a counterattack by enemy infantry
and tanks in Blatzheim and continued against Bergerhausen at
0400. In Bergerhausen enemy infantry defended stubbornly. They
were finally routed by the infantry of Task Force Doan. In mid-afternoon
the enemy counterattacked again with an infantry company and
several tanks. Division artillery broke up this attacking force
and made many gains.
Heavy Fighting as Push to Rhine Continues
To complete the blocking mission on the south flank, it was
essential that the town of Kerpen be taken. The canal bridge
just east of Bergerhausen was destroyed by the enemy and the
site was covered with heavy artillery and mortar fire. On the
morning of 28 February, Kerpen was secured after heavy fighting.
Early on the morning of 27 February when the attack had reached
the stage just described, General Rose decided to commit the
Division Reserve, Combat Command R, to force a crossing
of the Erft Canal. It had become apparent that the enemy was
not to be caught napping there, and a forced crossing was necessary.
The maneuver was executed on the afternoon of 27 February.
At Glesch, Task Force Hogan found a bridge that was not completely
destroyed. About four platoons of infantry scrambled across on
the remains to establish the first shallow bridgehead. Very heavy
mortar and artillery fire and considerable small arms fire pinned
this force to the ground.
At Paffendorf, Task Force Richardson found the existing bridge
completely destroyed. A bridgehead was established by two companies
of infantry who waded across. As at Glesch, enemy artillery and
mortar fire was very heavy.
Meanwhile, bridging operations at Glesch were held up because
of direct enemy fire on the site. The small infantry force that
had been able to cross could not advance sufficiently to take
this fire off the site.
Bridging operations at Paffendorf were successful in spite
of the heavy mortar and artillery fire that the enemy continued
to throw in. The treadway bridge was completed just in time to
allow the passage of supporting tanks for the infantry which
was at that time receiving a counterattack by a battalion of
enemy infantry and two enemy tanks. Because of strong artillery
and air support, this counterattack was defeated without loss
of ground. Task Force Hogan also moved a tank company across
this bridge to assist in expanding the shallow Glesch bridgehead.
There was considerable hard fighting to be done before continuing
the attack toward the Rhine River. The enemy still had observation
on both bridge sites. The Blesch and Paffendorf bridgeheads were
shallow and not linked up strongly.
On the night of 28 February, the Luftwaffe made a strong attack
on both bridge sites and supporting artillery positions. The
damage was not serious however, and four or five of the attacking
planes were destroyed by anti-aircraft fire.
On 2 March the attack to reach the Rhine area was launched
and met stubborn and organized resistance at every point. Heavy
enemy artillery and mortar fire continued and tanks were employed
in the vicinity of Neideraussem.
On 3 March, the 3rd Armored launched one of the most complicated
attacks it had ever attempted and one of the most successful.
The armored attack of the task forces of the three combat
commands moved with great speed in their respective zones. They
met with stronger resistance as they neared the Rhine. However,
the enemy could be surprised sometimes and surrendered many personnel
and much equipment without a fight. By the end of the day, the
different task forces of the 3rd had taken Roggendorf, Worringen,
Hackenbroich, Hackhausen, Geyen, Sinthem, and Pulheim. The division
was set for the attack on Cologne.
The Capture of Cologne
At 0400 on 4 March, all task forces attacked in their zones.
Resistance on the division right was scattered and light. On
the left, resistance was more stubborn, increasing with the proximity
to the Rhine River.
Leading elements of Combat Command A's Task Force, Doan entered
Cologne at 0710. House-to-house fighting developed, but the enemy
defended with little spirit. The sharpest engagement occurred
in the vicinity of the airfield which was defended by 16 88mm
guns, both anti-tank and dual-purpose weapons. All these guns
were overrun by a tank charge across the flat terrain executed
under smoke cover with infantry riding the tanks of Task Force
Kane.
On 6 March, all elements completed clearing the enemy from
their zones with the exception of a small sector in the northwestern
pan of Cologne which was cleared the following day.
Defensive sectors were established within the division boundaries
on 8 March. Patrols covered the entire area. On 17 March, the
104th Infantry Division relieved the 3rd Armored Division in
its defensive sector, and the 3rd Armored moved into assembly
area generally northwest of Bonn for regrouping and refitting.
On 20 March, the expansion of the Remagen bridgehead to the
north was in progress against increasing resistance, as American
forces approached the Sieg River. In order to give additional
strength to this attack, Combat Command R reconstituted and was
attached to the 1st Infantry Division and moved into the bridgehead.
They operated under the control of the 1st Infantry Division.
Then, on 21 March, they came under the 78th Infantry Division's
control in the area generally north and east of Beuel. Combat
Command R returned to control of 3rd Armored Division on 22 March
and assembled in the northern part of the newly assigned division
area in the vicinity of Honnef.
Next Chapter: Attack into Central Germany
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